And here "object" is quite vague, I would assume almost all of the specifications would be unrecognizable as such to a human.
And here "object" is quite vague, I would assume almost all of the specifications would be unrecognizable as such to a human.
1. Occam's Razor favors explanations with the fewest entities.
2. A single cause requires fewer assumptions than multiple causes.
3. Therefore, a singular cause is more parsimonious than a plural cause.
4. A singular cause ensures consistent intentionality and unified purpose.
5. Multiple causes would necessitate coordination and could result in conflicting intentions.
6. Therefore, the cause of the universe must be singular.
[0]: Not the same as the previously mentioned simplicity priors, as you brought up Occam's you must think God fits into logic.
That would in theory give priors for the probability of the "object" that fits the criteria given.
Sure, you can go into infinite regress arguments, but they hit both of our arguments just as hard.
As well as all the other hypotheses we can't meaningfully differentiate from it, almost none of them recognizable as your "God".
You can slap a hypercomputational simplicity prior on that if you want, but that probably militates against the object being God, because I wouldn't expect God to be "simple" under that definition.