A canny torturer would read the Smart People on a public forum red-teaming cperciva's mind.
All it does is, should that occur, prevent you from giving the torturer what they want to end the torture.
OTOH, convincing the torturer by, among other means, public statements in advance that you have failed to consider this anhd believe that not having that ability prevents torture, and that for this reason you do not have it, might prevent torture. But that's a big gamble on potential future torturers believing your public statements of motivation.
But I can't be coerced into adding a backdoor into past versions of Tarsnap, because I don't have a time machine.
And then wait for a scheduled backup with the backdoored client.
Though XZ says that's impossible, so I won't lose sleep over that scenario.
Honestly, I really wish the Tarsnap server was open source. I imagine it has not been released as such because that would probably hurt the business a lot, especially given that the costs per GB are currently approximately 50 times more than I would pay for simple object storage on B2.
I built our company's first backup solution on Tarsnap, but when I projected out what deploying that to our entire fleet would cost, I rebuilt on Restic. We currently pay something like $250/mo for our backups, as opposed to the approximately $12,500/mo they would cost on Tarsnap.
By the way, I absolutely love spiped. It beats the pants off stunnel in both stability and performance. Maybe Colin should close-source that and start charging $0.25/GB for traffic that flows through there too? :P
He's been doing this long enough, I'm not even prepared to dunk on him for picodollar pricing anymore.
That is to say, it's entirely possible that you were already tortured and the backdoor is already there by using the same logic - no time machine needed
Like already said unfortunately the only safety would be reading the code
Surely some three letters organization probably could pull that off, but it add risk to their operation that the operation could be leaked.
This is basically a point I've made in a few of my talks about security and cryptography: The point of cryptography isn't to guarantee that your data is safe; it's to raise the cost of an attack to the point where a potential attacker decides not to attack. In particular, there's usually a human involved somewhere (sending or receiving information, or both) and humans are squishy and fragile; but torturing people attracts far more adverse attention than torturing data.
In either case, you'd have to fool the internet army, who are watching the source code of projects such as this like a hawk.