The most egregious stuff in 2008 was mispricing MBSs. Incorrectly pricing risk is pretty far from stealing money from investors/depositors.
The most egregious stuff in 2008 was mispricing MBSs. Incorrectly pricing risk is pretty far from stealing money from investors/depositors.
>for a fraudulent and deceptive scheme to package and sell residential mortgage-backed securities that the bank knew contained a material amount of materially defective loans.
If that's not enough, if we want to look just beyond 2008, they pulled a scam to manipulate the part of the settlement which was suppose to 4 billion in loan relief for home owners[3] by forgiving phony mortgages.
I have more, if so desired, but I didn't want this to turn into a hundred link dump of information that would be very dense to read.
[0]: https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/09/jamie-dimon-billion-...
[1]: https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/jamie-dimons-13-bi...
[2]: https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/943201311191510319...
[3]: https://billmoyers.com/story/special-investigation-americas-...
>Reuters has found that some of the biggest U.S. banks and other "loan servicers" continue to file questionable foreclosure documents with courts and county clerks. They are using tactics that late last year triggered an outcry, multiple investigations and temporary moratoriums on foreclosures.
>In recent months, servicers have filed thousands of documents that appear to have been fabricated or improperly altered, or have sworn to false facts. Reuters also identified at least six "robo-signers," individuals who in recent months have each signed thousands of mortgage assignments -- legal documents which pinpoint ownership of a property. These same individuals have been identified -- in depositions, court testimony or court rulings -- as previously having signed vast numbers of foreclosure documents that they never read or checked.
https://www.reuters.com/article/world/special-report-banks-s...
But then you have to ask if the institutions doing the application verifications were criminally negligent.
That wasn't negligent. It was intentional.
Not by the institution, but by the officers acting against the interests of the institution.
A tiny example out of so many: it is against the interest of a secured lender to inflate appraised value or allow them to be inflated.
Yet, starting at 2004, appraisers across the country started reporting that they were being pressured to inflate appraisals and blacklisted when they refused.
This is clear indication of fraud against the institution and regulators. There is simply no honest reason to inflate appraisals.
The institution made a bunch of money. In the ghoulish way banks behave, the institutions interests are only making money. The officers were acting in the interest of the institution the way they understand them.
"The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance defines the duty of care as the duty by which a corporate director or officer is required to perform their functions in good faith; in a manner that they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation; and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances (negligence standard)."
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/80a-35
That's just one example. I expect that, had they wanted to, the government could have found many applicable laws to go after those responsible for the financial crisis.
[1] https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimon...
You would need to classify everything from consumer reports to industry awards to not inviting influencers who give negative reviews to events as stealing as well.
> Another email between colleagues at Standard & Poor's written before the bubble burst, suggests awareness of what would happen to the securities they were giving top ratings to: "Rating agencies continue to create and [sic] even bigger monster--the CDO market. Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters."
They were willing participants precisely because they were making huge fees to look the other way.
> One study of "6,500 structured debt ratings" produced by Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, found ratings by agencies "biased in favour of issuer clients that provide the agencies with more rating business. This result points to a powerful conflict of interest, which goes beyond the occasional disagreement among employees."
These kinds of things are deals negotiated at the highest level of the companies involved. Credit agencies were paid to give the crime the banks were doing a veneer of respectability.
To me it just seems a more or less natural outcome of the major structural flaws in the whole business model. I’m not sure you need an explicit conspiracy for credit agencies to begin behaving in such a way that maximizes their revenue, it was mostly just a natural outcome of competition and extremely useless and inefficient regulation. If anyone deserves to go to prison it’s the people who were supposed to be regulating the banking industry.
Obviously the Federal government had zero interest in doing that but if they only went after the bankers it would have quickly become obvious that they are not the only ones to blame.
If you can actually draw a distinction between what scammers do and what companies do other than “we explicitly have laws on the books to treat it as a crime” I’d love to hear it. There’s a lot of similarities between corporations and criminal organizational - it’s just groups of people who are trying to make money.
And as for who deserves to go to prison, the ratings agencies refused to pay market rates to retain talent being poached by the banks. The same happens in government. So basically the banks continually poach the best people and create incentives to keep the status quo and for regulators to turn a blind eye so that they can land at the bank later. You can go after the regulators but I don’t think that’s going to be an effective strategy to solve the problem.
Yeah but IMO the scam part is mostly tangential. It hardly matters what did the CEO do with the stolen money, he could have gambled it away at a casino or bought a yacht with it, at the end of the day he still stole it and that’s the crime we’re discussing here.
> You can go after the regulators but I don’t think that’s going to be an effective strategy to solve the problem.
Yes, but going after the bankers would have exposed the extreme incompetence by the regulators and if you started unwinding the whole thing it would have affected a lot of high level people in government. So it’s rather obvious that that they had very little desire to prosecute anyone.
And it hardly matters who deserves what since you can’t send anyone who was just exploiting loopholes and didn’t clearly brake any laws regardless how immoral or unethical their actions were.
Yea, probably there was invidual cases of bribing like in all industries. But overall the issue wasn't oughtright bribes.
I know, I know. Requiring conspirators to say "this is a bribe" for there to be legal jeopardy is sort of nuts.