Seriously?
Seriously?
Someone (or some AI) copies an example auth implementation from stackoverflow. Being sensible they realise they shouldn't put key material in source code either, so they leave "secret" in place, and pop a ticket in JIRA to update with the key material from the vault before it goes live.
Employee falls ill, everything gets re-assigned. Leaves before it gets actioned and that ticket slips through the cracks, with the person taking over their duties not realising how serious "J10243: Populate secret from key vault" actually is, perhaps assuming it's currently coming from a different configuration location.
There's little chance that the regular testing are discovering the flaw as the key gen based on "secret" goes live.
Because it doesn't say what you seem to think it does.
Their password? "internet"
I sent them an email showing them their vulns. I never followed up to see if they did anything about it.
[0] they had a forum that allowed profile pic uploads but it didn't check they were images, so I crafted an ASP page which emulated a file explorer and uploaded that, then browsed to it.
> This is implemented on top of cookies for you and signs the cookies cryptographically. What this means is that the user could look at the contents of your cookie but not modify it, unless they know the secret key used for signing.
Please stop.
> By default flask doesnt have a db.
Do not trust the data you send to a user, to remain secure.
Security through obscurity is allowing REST commands to the /totallysecretaddress/neverleaked/ URI.
> django-admin startproject automatically adds a randomly-generated SECRET_KEY to each new project
https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/ref/settings/#secret-k...