I am positive that people in hospitals died as a direct result of this incident.
I'm less positive than you, just because my experience of healthcare infosec is that all a doctor has to do is say "I cannot be slowed down or prevented from doing x or people will die" and that's the end of any process or technical controls on x.
Same with utilities. I've seen the ICS engineers say "No you cannot put a password on this console because I may need instant access to prevent a blackout / explosion" and that pretty much ends the discussion.
Often that's not even wrong. Of course when there is a security incident there'll be a kneejerk reaction to that, and of course that's why ransomware groups love healthcare, but in the meantime, those risks seem reasonable.
Which means I'm guessing Crowdstrike killed a lot of healthcare billing but not a lot of critical care systems because it got ripped off those 30 seconds after install if it was ever installed at all.
Do you have clinical or hospital administration experience? A source with evidence, even circumstantial?
>> Yes
You managed a hospital and failed to implement emergency downtime procedures? (Because that is actually criminal.) Or do you have a source?
Agreed. It’s also plausible someone had a heart attack due to the stress of flight cancellations. Do we have any evidence of either?
The difference between a bridge collapsing and everything we’re discussing is there isn’t much of a discussion around who died and why.
It’s a glib response, but so is “yes” to a request for attribution.