The obvious counterpoint to this argument is what happened in Hong Kong. A diplomatic resolution seems unlikely to have a net-positive outcome for Taiwan under the current CCP regime.
An EU-style arrangement seems ideal in the medium term. It lets Taiwan have a positive long-term influence on Chinese politics, while preventing HK-style crackdowns in the other direction.
Being 1 of 4 is not so good, particularly when 1 is so big and the other two (Macau, HK) are defanged, and a federal devolution to the provinces of China is not in the cards.
2. Germany makes up 18% of the EU’s population. The PRC makes up 98% of the combined populations of Taiwan, PRC, HK and Macau. That is quite the difference in lopsided power balance.
current_state = alpha * one_country + (1 - alpha) * two_countries
The problem is as PRC military modernizes and regional force balances shift more in PRC favour, I see them benefitting massively from war, especially broader one with US+co. PRC can live with taking TW (by whichever means), but what PRC really wants is US out of backyard, and TW is prime casus belli for participating in one, or rather not avoiding one if US intervenes. Longer US tries to contain, dance away from strategic ambiguity, the more perverse PRC incentives get.
I think the PRC is aware that if there is a PRC-TW war, there is nothing that will stop Japan from ramping up their military and acquiring a nuclear deterrent. The situation on the Korean peninsula is even easier to destabilize.
I'm reassured by the fact that the PRC has not taken steps to convert its economy to internal demand. It's still in export-led growth mode (not coincidentally the same industrialization model used by TW and HK.)
Except for TW, no one would lose more economically than the PRC if there is war.
US won't leave JP/SKR/PH irrespective of TW, where they have token presence, and not integral to US east asia security architecture. That's really the broader security consideration, PRC doesn't want US in her backyard, PRC wants her own Munroe, and historically that involves forcing hegemon out / demonstrating their presense cannot be sustained.
JP/SKR nuclearizing more complex topic, e.g. it's against US interest since it erodes US control, forces PRC to build up ABM which is net bad for US strategic posture etc and imo makes PRC more likely to start pressing against US presence in region to turn up temperature knowing JP/SKR has higher chance to reduce US partnership if they feel comfortable with own nukes. Dynamics complicated, but I will just say nuclear powers like RU, and NKR, and eventually IR can still have their existence degraded via conventional means without raising to nuclear, and both those countries being import dependent islands (SKR functionally) are much more suspectible to conventional disruptions.
>convert economy
PRC exports to gdp 20%, about half to west, it's not _as_ domestic driven as US, but on export:gdp spectrum it's one of the least export led major economies. Export led is like >50%, TW/HK is like 60% and HK is like 200%. Most growth comes from internal consumption, exports help in geoeconomics, but numbers also go up stupid amounts in war economy.
>Except for TW, no one would lose more economically than the PRC if there is war.
Really depends on scale/scope of war. Taking out 95% leading edge TW semi effect on western tech hard to quantify in $$$ and capability terms, but it's not minor. Get JP/SKR involved, PRC's largest export competitor (electronics/cars etc) / regional influencer (JP FDI), and all of a sudden 1trillion+ per year in regional spoils open up. Open up mainland strikes = openning CONUS for retaliation, and PRC pursuing conventional global strike. And US by virtue of being reigning hegemon with most, also has most to lose. A lot of US hegemonic structures depend on CONUS serenity, which ended/ending with advanced rocketry. Think of what happens when US/PRC start trading energy infra, data warehouses, aviation plants, who has more global footprint to lose. Who has more people/excess capacity to reconstitute faster? Who really has most to lose, and what can be gained. Even phyric victory has a relative victor, and not all wounds heal the same. I think that's what missing from strategic thinking about TW scenarios involving US+co. For PRC, TW is most emotionally/politically important piece of US containment architecture. But JP/SKR/PH more strategically important. As long as US contains with forward posture, PRC will try to break containment. And I don't think US leaving without a fight.
Personally I think that it's pretty much unavoidable for both. The only tricky part is not tipping the North Koreans over the edge. It's not as destabilizing as proliferation in other regions would be just because there isn't a long list of other countries that might domino afterwards.
As for the Chinese trade-to-GDP ratio, it doesn't really capture how the economy is structured, particularly how far it leans into its comparative advantage. Many EU economies have higher ratios but are not imbalanced in this fashion. Italy buys French wine and France buys Italian wine. But if the world stops driving cars tomorrow, Germany (which is more like China in this respect) is going to hurt bad.
I would also caution you against thinking that there's such a thing as "spoils" anymore - certainly not post-WW2. Just look at how expensive the fields of Ukrainian rubble are turning out to be for Russia. Obviously Russia is looking at a bigger picture, or it would be regretting the war.
In today's world, denying GDP is easy, capturing it is very hard.
Export:GDP does capture sense of limits of damage. Having only 20% (PRC), vs 50% (Germany) matters. @20%, 10% of which is trade to west, PRC is simply not export dependant, it doesn't have same exposure profile, i.e. for all the talk of PRC auto excess capacity, ~10% of production went towards export, meanwhile DE is 60%+. The difference is between a mild sprain vs spine snapping.
I think post WW3, can be like post WW2, where huge consolidation of spoils under US control after every other industrial powers was crippled. Yes, capturing GDP in peacetime against incumbent is _HARD_, especially in strategic sectors with large moats (geopolitical not just technical). So hard that what ends up being easier might be to _destroy_ concentration of GDP. PRC hitting Boeing, F35 plants, mastercard / payment processors, seven sisters data centres, severing fiber optic cables... all the stuff where US has built up disproportionate control/share via various post war momentum mechanisms opens up huge global spoils for grab. It might not be PRC doing the grabbing, as PRC will be reconstituting as well, but but sometimes it's important to not just deny, but destroy, make net negative. A builder in a 100k house and a banker in a 200k house burn each others houses down, the banker loses more, while the builder has capacity to rebuild their house faster. Everyone in neighbourhood use to goto parties at bankers house, will they go to the builder's house parties after? Maybe if the builder recovers fast enough, maybe neighbours will do their own thing. Either banker likely to lose most. Which is not to suggest destroying GDP is an "easy" decision, but it is naturally "easy" escalation once the hard decision of going to war is made.
That's a total nonstarter though. The CCP is not going to subordinate itself and cede power to some EU-like supranational authority that it doesn't utterly dominate, and it has also demonstrated how much its own guarantees are worth (with the HK crackdown).
That's an utter fantasy, especially by the mechanism you propose.
To be absolutely blunt: your proposal strikes me as the kind of thing a no-nothing outsider would propose, someone who has no skin in the game and would suffer none of the consequences, and whose ignorance makes a solution seem easy.
I mean, FFS, (assuming your an American) would you propose a supra-national union between the US and China with "proportional representation" (meaning China dominates the US) and a mere hope that China's politics become "more like" democracy?
In the 2000 presidential election, independent candidate James Soon
proposed a European Union-style relation with mainland China (this
was echoed by Hsu Hsin-liang in 2004) along with a non-aggression pact.
In the 2004 presidential election, Lien Chan proposed a
confederation-style relationship. [1]
What China did to HK was blatantly breaking a treaty with the UK. Do you think for the minute Taiwan does this EU thing the same will not eventually happen ?
It's basically a big de-escalation from the crisis we have now and a major step towards their future together in "One China." Unlike HK, it's done gradually and at arm's length.