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Comment by worstspotgain | Hacker News Reader

If there ever was a major conflict with a diplomatic alternative, this is it. China's attitude towards Taiwan is mostly petty and dates back to the drunken bar fight with Chiang Kai-shek, who's been dead for 50 years.

The key to peace is the general understanding that the two countries will be reunited at some unspecified future point. Historically, this has been the keystone that let the doves carry the day. In the 2000s the Taiwanese were floating the idea of an EU-style arrangement, which could be the bridge there.

We keep letting Putin's stooges egg us on against China, which he needs to do to keep it firmly in his camp. I wouldn't be surprised if confrontational fervors in Taiwan were being stoked by outside sources.

The one thing that's changed the most in recent years is that China's military might has been increasing steadily. This both increases the risk of war and is motivated by the antagonism. De-escalating the Taiwan Strait with diplomatic means can pay off handsomely.

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The obvious counterpoint to this argument is what happened in Hong Kong. A diplomatic resolution seems unlikely to have a net-positive outcome for Taiwan under the current CCP regime.

Taiwan has obviously been watching the Hong Kong integration closely. Had it gone much better, Taiwan would have probably agreed to something similar. Frankly I think they were actually expecting much worse.

An EU-style arrangement seems ideal in the medium term. It lets Taiwan have a positive long-term influence on Chinese politics, while preventing HK-style crackdowns in the other direction.

How does an “EU” style arrangement make sense between two countries, one of which is extremely large the other extremely small?

It makes sense because it functions as a bridge to eventual reunification. And the EU includes e.g. Luxembourg and Germany. The arrangement transfers some matters to unified control while retaining country sovereignty.

The thing is that in EU they are two of 27.

Being 1 of 4 is not so good, particularly when 1 is so big and the other two (Macau, HK) are defanged, and a federal devolution to the provinces of China is not in the cards.

Well no one is doubting that the federal portion of the framework would be mainland-dominated, just like Germany has way more seats in the EU parliament than Luxembourg. But Taiwanese democracy (and military control) would be unaffected.

1. There is no scenario in which the PRC would relinquish military control

2. Germany makes up 18% of the EU’s population. The PRC makes up 98% of the combined populations of Taiwan, PRC, HK and Macau. That is quite the difference in lopsided power balance.

The PRC wouldn't have to relinquish military control, or really any control for that matter. The "Union" is basically the portion of control that Taiwan has already ceded to China. The key is that Taiwan retains the rest for the time being.

From PRC perspective, HK integration went poorly for PRC interests because HK failed to implement national security law on their own (which btw they were suppose to pre 50 year handover) - they simply never took the One Country part of One Country Two Systems seriously. And TBH neither will TW with how much culture diverged over generations, hence the sweeter 1C2S deal PRC offered TW where they got to keep political system and even their own military got taken off the table a few years ago. Political reality is PRC T1 is pretty comfy now, mainlanders don't see TW/HK as "betters" like in 80s/90s, there's no appetite for PRC domestic audience to give concessions to TW or HK to have disproportionate influence over mainland with less than 1% of the population, especially when their system isn't viewed as particularly functional. Apart from baizuos, the amount of PRC who looks at TW politics and think "I want that" is smaller than than most democracygud crowd thinks.

I don't think this has to be necessarily sold as the PRC giving concessions to TW. It's basically a linear combination, where alpha is being ramped from 0 to 1:

   current_state = alpha * one_country + (1 - alpha) * two_countries

Neither the PRC nor TW benefits from war if it can be avoided. This is a much better alternative.

That's potentially something for next gen TWers to decide, too much anti PRC sentiment on TW right now. Need a multiple more election cycles before TW get jaded with (still relatively nascent) democracy, already seeing that this election cycle. But will ultimately take next gen, assuming there's enough numbers with TWs bad demographics for new voting cohorts going through TW economic stagnation (assuming it continues) and look at next gen HKers who are basically fine post NSL, and doing well integrating with mainland, and see perhaps option not so bad to war. Even then it's a stretch, and that's decades out, with soft 2049 deadline.

The problem is as PRC military modernizes and regional force balances shift more in PRC favour, I see them benefitting massively from war, especially broader one with US+co. PRC can live with taking TW (by whichever means), but what PRC really wants is US out of backyard, and TW is prime casus belli for participating in one, or rather not avoiding one if US intervenes. Longer US tries to contain, dance away from strategic ambiguity, the more perverse PRC incentives get.

Nothing would do more to get the US out of the PRC's backyard than if the TW crisis is resolved amicably with an EU-style arrangement.

I think the PRC is aware that if there is a PRC-TW war, there is nothing that will stop Japan from ramping up their military and acquiring a nuclear deterrent. The situation on the Korean peninsula is even easier to destabilize.

I'm reassured by the fact that the PRC has not taken steps to convert its economy to internal demand. It's still in export-led growth mode (not coincidentally the same industrialization model used by TW and HK.)

Except for TW, no one would lose more economically than the PRC if there is war.

E: accidentally posted empty reply

US won't leave JP/SKR/PH irrespective of TW, where they have token presence, and not integral to US east asia security architecture. That's really the broader security consideration, PRC doesn't want US in her backyard, PRC wants her own Munroe, and historically that involves forcing hegemon out / demonstrating their presense cannot be sustained.

JP/SKR nuclearizing more complex topic, e.g. it's against US interest since it erodes US control, forces PRC to build up ABM which is net bad for US strategic posture etc and imo makes PRC more likely to start pressing against US presence in region to turn up temperature knowing JP/SKR has higher chance to reduce US partnership if they feel comfortable with own nukes. Dynamics complicated, but I will just say nuclear powers like RU, and NKR, and eventually IR can still have their existence degraded via conventional means without raising to nuclear, and both those countries being import dependent islands (SKR functionally) are much more suspectible to conventional disruptions.

>convert economy

PRC exports to gdp 20%, about half to west, it's not _as_ domestic driven as US, but on export:gdp spectrum it's one of the least export led major economies. Export led is like >50%, TW/HK is like 60% and HK is like 200%. Most growth comes from internal consumption, exports help in geoeconomics, but numbers also go up stupid amounts in war economy.

>Except for TW, no one would lose more economically than the PRC if there is war.

Really depends on scale/scope of war. Taking out 95% leading edge TW semi effect on western tech hard to quantify in $$$ and capability terms, but it's not minor. Get JP/SKR involved, PRC's largest export competitor (electronics/cars etc) / regional influencer (JP FDI), and all of a sudden 1trillion+ per year in regional spoils open up. Open up mainland strikes = openning CONUS for retaliation, and PRC pursuing conventional global strike. And US by virtue of being reigning hegemon with most, also has most to lose. A lot of US hegemonic structures depend on CONUS serenity, which ended/ending with advanced rocketry. Think of what happens when US/PRC start trading energy infra, data warehouses, aviation plants, who has more global footprint to lose. Who has more people/excess capacity to reconstitute faster? Who really has most to lose, and what can be gained. Even phyric victory has a relative victor, and not all wounds heal the same. I think that's what missing from strategic thinking about TW scenarios involving US+co. For PRC, TW is most emotionally/politically important piece of US containment architecture. But JP/SKR/PH more strategically important. As long as US contains with forward posture, PRC will try to break containment. And I don't think US leaving without a fight.

It's not that Japan and South Korea going nuclear erodes US control, it's just that all proliferation is inherently destabilizing. Believe it or not, the US is not "in it for the imperialism" like, say, Russia is in Africa.

Personally I think that it's pretty much unavoidable for both. The only tricky part is not tipping the North Koreans over the edge. It's not as destabilizing as proliferation in other regions would be just because there isn't a long list of other countries that might domino afterwards.

As for the Chinese trade-to-GDP ratio, it doesn't really capture how the economy is structured, particularly how far it leans into its comparative advantage. Many EU economies have higher ratios but are not imbalanced in this fashion. Italy buys French wine and France buys Italian wine. But if the world stops driving cars tomorrow, Germany (which is more like China in this respect) is going to hurt bad.

I would also caution you against thinking that there's such a thing as "spoils" anymore - certainly not post-WW2. Just look at how expensive the fields of Ukrainian rubble are turning out to be for Russia. Obviously Russia is looking at a bigger picture, or it would be regretting the war.

In today's world, denying GDP is easy, capturing it is very hard.

I didn't characterize US control as imperialist, I characterize it as hegemonic. Much of the post WW2 treatsies in region were specifically setup to enable US security presence to uphold military hegemony via forward basing and keeping basing partners denuclearized to make them dependant on US security commitments. Nuclear domino "afterwards" is also matter of time frames and geography. If JP/SKR nuclearizes, PRC will work towards south american nuclearization in US backyard when conditions enables it, including selling all the missile and launch hardware (see Saudi). That's what US has to worry about about loosening proliferation.

Export:GDP does capture sense of limits of damage. Having only 20% (PRC), vs 50% (Germany) matters. @20%, 10% of which is trade to west, PRC is simply not export dependant, it doesn't have same exposure profile, i.e. for all the talk of PRC auto excess capacity, ~10% of production went towards export, meanwhile DE is 60%+. The difference is between a mild sprain vs spine snapping.

I think post WW3, can be like post WW2, where huge consolidation of spoils under US control after every other industrial powers was crippled. Yes, capturing GDP in peacetime against incumbent is _HARD_, especially in strategic sectors with large moats (geopolitical not just technical). So hard that what ends up being easier might be to _destroy_ concentration of GDP. PRC hitting Boeing, F35 plants, mastercard / payment processors, seven sisters data centres, severing fiber optic cables... all the stuff where US has built up disproportionate control/share via various post war momentum mechanisms opens up huge global spoils for grab. It might not be PRC doing the grabbing, as PRC will be reconstituting as well, but but sometimes it's important to not just deny, but destroy, make net negative. A builder in a 100k house and a banker in a 200k house burn each others houses down, the banker loses more, while the builder has capacity to rebuild their house faster. Everyone in neighbourhood use to goto parties at bankers house, will they go to the builder's house parties after? Maybe if the builder recovers fast enough, maybe neighbours will do their own thing. Either banker likely to lose most. Which is not to suggest destroying GDP is an "easy" decision, but it is naturally "easy" escalation once the hard decision of going to war is made.

> An EU-style arrangement seems ideal in the medium term. It lets Taiwan have a positive long-term influence on Chinese politics, while preventing HK-style crackdowns in the other direction.

That's a total nonstarter though. The CCP is not going to subordinate itself and cede power to some EU-like supranational authority that it doesn't utterly dominate, and it has also demonstrated how much its own guarantees are worth (with the HK crackdown).

Obviously China would utterly dominate the super-national authority due to proportional representation. The point is to move towards unification while Taiwan remains a sovereign country in the interim. Taiwan becomes more of a part of China over time, while hopefully China's politics become more like Taiwan's.

> ...while hopefully China's politics become more like Taiwan's.

That's an utter fantasy, especially by the mechanism you propose.

To be absolutely blunt: your proposal strikes me as the kind of thing a no-nothing outsider would propose, someone who has no skin in the game and would suffer none of the consequences, and whose ignorance makes a solution seem easy.

I mean, FFS, (assuming your an American) would you propose a supra-national union between the US and China with "proportional representation" (meaning China dominates the US) and a mere hope that China's politics become "more like" democracy?

Uh, no. As I said up top, I didn't come up with the idea:

   In the 2000 presidential election, independent candidate James Soon
   proposed a European Union-style relation with mainland China (this
   was echoed by Hsu Hsin-liang in 2004) along with a non-aggression pact.
   In the 2004 presidential election, Lien Chan proposed a
   confederation-style relationship. [1]

It seems to me that maybe your dismissal of the CCP making concessions towards unification in general fits the notion of a "know-nothing outsider" much more than what I wrote. Both China and Taiwan have long held that there is only "One China" and that they eventually belong together.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_unification

We thought bringing more capitalism would open up the CCP to more progressive government and attitude towards their citizens. None of that happened, and it’s probably worse now than in the 70s when Nixon gave it a shot. It was a complete failure.

No it won't, China will eventually impose its policies on Taiwan. It is just a matter of time.

What China did to HK was blatantly breaking a treaty with the UK. Do you think for the minute Taiwan does this EU thing the same will not eventually happen ?

In the union-style arrangements, Taiwan retains its military and thus its negotiating power.

It's basically a big de-escalation from the crisis we have now and a major step towards their future together in "One China." Unlike HK, it's done gradually and at arm's length.

I do not understand Xi’s abandonment of Deng’s wise policies. The One China, Two Systems approach was working and had it gone well may have induced Taiwan to similarly integrate with the PRC. Now, I doubt that will ever happen.

Can't say I understand it either, but I'm not Chinese and I think there are some cultural differences here. Politically, I think there's a tendency to overestimate and overreact (e.g. Tiananmen Square) and a tendency to get irritated easily. Again, fertile ground for diplomacy.

Communism is a hellavea ideological drug.

Xi seems your standard dictator who wants to control everything - HK, Taiwan, south china sea, overseas critics and so on. It's a shame we don't still have Deng.

There are different shades of net negative from Being HK, who are now happily partying in Shenzhen, or being Gaza.

Right, CCP will never let democracy flourish “inside its borders” it’s much too dangerous to them, even in a territory, or even a large metro area. Liberty is in diametric contrast to them controlling every aspect of their citizens’ lives

> The key to peace is the general understanding that the two countries will be reunited at some unspecified future point.

One side surrendering usually is a key to peace.

But realistically, can you imagine the CCP submitting to the will of Taiwanese voters?

IMO, Taiwan has proven that democracy can eventually work in China too. The question is: how do they get there? And more importantly: why are we antagonizing and warmongering instead of taking actions that further that goal?

It’s China who is bullying Taiwan. Taiwan could never have dealings with China ever again and be fine.

Taiwan is a legit democracy. Elections. Rule of law. Freedom.

PRC is not.

I suppose Taiwan could be a “special administrative region.” But that doesn’t offer many guarantees, does it?

What's the endgame with China?

No one wants Global Thermonuclear War.

A renewed Cold War is only possible if China is in Russia's camp. This is not really in China's interest any more than it is in ours. It's only in Russia's interest.

The only good endgame is "China becomes a normal nation."

This was the premise for granting it MNF trading status in the 90s. It included the notion that democracy would rub off automagically, which was obviously wishful thinking. To be fair, democracy's track record hasn't been all that hot in recent years, in no small part because of Russia's worldwide meddling push.

Recently, we've basically given up on pushing for the only good possible endgame outcome. We've largely succumbed to Russia's instigation.

It's very unlikely that the CCP will turn democratic overnight. The path there is one of incremental changes. Instead of demanding free and fair elections, freedom of dissent and freedom of the press from day one, we should get back in the nudging game.

Coincidentally, no one would be in a better position to nudge China along than Taiwan inside of an EU-style framework.

Short of a coup or rebellion, China isn’t turning “democratic” in the next hundred years. 50 years of favored trading status with various countries has done nothing but cause CCP to dig in harder and it’s a bigger dictatorship than even Mao imagined.

I'm not sure where you're getting your 100-year crystal ball. Instead of hating on them (which coincidentally is exactly what Putin wants us to do,) why don't we try to break the problem down?

The biggest difference between the Chinese system and ours is not the selection of leaders, which is a lot more "democratic" there than in many of our allies like Saudi Arabia. It's tolerance for dissent.

The trick is that the CCP (which at this point is about as communist as Quaker Oats is Quaker) don't have to shed their power base to do it. They just have to have more than one, without horribly repressing the others.

In practice, countries can end up having a dominant party while being actually democratic, like Mexico and South Africa did for a long time (or Oklahoma and California for that matter.) Often, the dominant party meddles with the media and stacks the deck in their favor. The rest of the world grumbles but keeps playing along.

I think ruling elites find it hard to even entertain the notion of dismantling a conformist monoculture. It is a mixed bag from their perspective, and they're technically not wrong: they'll have to deal with e.g. populist morons, foreign-backed candidates, and political disruption. But it's for the best for their country and the planet.

A coup or rebellion isn't needed. It's much more likely to play out as a set of reforms pushed by "visionary leaders," like Perestroika in the mid-80s. This is what we should be pushing for, in front of and behind the scenes.

There are no legitimate democracies. There is the west, those who align with it, and the rest of the world who dont, and the rest of the world who are against the west.

Taiwan is with the west. China is the rest. That’s your guarantee

I know nothing of the history, but I always imagined part of this was wanting control over the chip factories.

If I were China, I'd be infuriated watching all the best tech get made just offshore and having it all under pretty much western control.

My guess is that the fabs would turn to rubble pretty quickly in a conflict (and we might not even find out who did it.)

That could also be a positive outcome for China.

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