Trying to come up with a compelling reason for why we're not "biological computers" (and this "trying" in itself is half-giving away of one's point in this types of discussions) would involve long discussions going all the way back to the French Enlightenment and the likes of La Mettrie, not sure any online discussion would get to the end of it.
This is part of why I don't see any compelling evidence why we are not biological computers, much as it pains people to admit so.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessity_and_sufficiency
Plus, there are identifiable differences (disproving the "just as"): LLM's can reliably acknowledge epistemic unsoundness in their prior claims without aversion and rhetoric.
You have not actually answered my question however, your comment is a deflection of what I'm asking, so I will ask again, why are biological beings not considered computational? They do the same thing a general computer can do. And again, by "computer," I do not necessarily mean silicon-based, Von Neumann architecture computers.
1. What a strange comment.
2. They do support my answer to your question: "how one cannot say that biological machines compute "just as"(!) silicon based computers do"
> Yes, while you can repeat something often enough for it to appear true, it may not actually be true; this is a vacuous statement that does not need to be stated
It is directly related to your question, and the underlying phenomenon: human belief (more popularly known as: truth, the reality, etc).
> You have not actually answered my question however, your comment is a deflection of what I'm asking, so I will ask again, why are biological beings not considered computational?
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41056319
"I am asking in the general sense how one cannot say that biological machines compute just as silicon based computers do."
That is the question I answered.
As for "Why are biological beings not considered computational?"
Well, consciousness (which implements "considering") is not understood, so it is unknown. But as my last link above describes, instances of can be made to function certain ways simply by good story telling. So in this case, maybe some chunk of the whole have heard that they are not computational.
> They do the same thing a general computer can do.
The ambiguity and misinformative of English (as we (or at least I) see here) is why I linked to Set Theory. Do you see the relevance?
If you're going to casually dismiss twenty years of funded research on the topic you asked about, then this is a self-regulating thread.
https://constructivist.info/riegler/pub/riegler05foerster.ht...
> Artificial neural networks were one of the “hot” topics at the BCL. They combine engineering.. and empirical science.. As early as in 1960, the BCL developed a neural network prototype called “Numa-Rete,” which could count objects irrespective of their shape and size.
https://news.ycombinator.com/context?id=12098476
The reductionist eventually comes to know everything about nothing (by way of distinction) - the wholist eventually comes to know nothing about everything (by way of generalization).Again you misunderstand what I am asking for. There is no use in me asking for the color blue and you talking about the color red, then when I say, I am asking about blue, you tell me that there has been 20 years of research on red. That may be true but that is not what I am asking about.
Multiple, independent responses to your "question" have said almost the same thing. Good luck finding different answers.
If you want to move the conversation forward in your new thread, you can offer evidence of a positive claim, instead of asking others to provide evidence of a negative claim.