Eg. I have a router sharing wifi for 'work' with a permanently maintained vpn connection to the workplace intranet. Another sharing wifi as 'Australia' that I connect to whenever I want to watch TV from Australia with a VPN to an Australian server and lastly the standard home Internet wifi.
It's super easy to do if you have a couple of old wifi routers and even cheap home ones seem to have some VPN support these days. A big advantage, aside from centralizing the VPN setup so you don't screw it up is that it's trivial to connect any device to the VPN. Just join the relevant wifi address! Boom I'm now in a VPN to Australia from any device without messing around setting up that device specifically because I connected to the 'Australia' wifi.
I do this with multiple old routers but I actually think there's probably a market for a single home router that vpns to multiple locations in the world with a different wifi network for each of those just for the sake of easily having your TV/Roku/iPad appearing to be from somewhere else trivially.
The attack seems most feasible in a coffee shop wifi situation, where you’re unlikely to be bringing your own router.
*by “unencrypted traffic” I mean traffic that’s not encapsulated for transport to your VPN provider. Most everything is HTTPS nowadays so the contents of that traffic would still be encrypted of course.
Personally I wouldn't bother with the hassle and would instead just rely on an on-device VPN which I now would need to ensure is protected from this type of attack.
This uses DHCP Options to set routes, which is an optional behavior on the client (but on by default), I have it disabled. I also don’t allow setting DNS via DHCP or anything but giving me an IP and gateway. Clients behind the device are unimpacted, the device itself is configured in a way which eliminates this vulnerability.