Isn't that a bad question to ask, it suggests there are only two possible outcomes, wouldn't a better question include a third option of "not a bank teller and may or may not be a active feminist"?
Isn't that a bad question to ask, it suggests there are only two possible outcomes, wouldn't a better question include a third option of "not a bank teller and may or may not be a active feminist"?
I'd imagine there's enough stuff Kahneman identified with biases that have held up and don't involve artificial questions like this designed to trick the respondents whose real world applicability seem questionable at best...
further, in the supplied example, I'd argue that the prior probability of Linda being a feminist (based on her being an activist/etc.) is probably higher than her not being a feminist so, in a sense the respondents got it right (i.e., in that population, I'd argue there are more women who are bank tellers and feminists than just bank tellers)...
- It was also touched on in the original paper that Tversky and Kahneman put out https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-03110-001
> The conjunction fallacy (also known as the Linda problem) is an inference that a conjoint set of two or more specific conclusions is likelier than any single member of that same set, in violation of the laws of probability.