Apps that read inbound SMS may be malicious and use that ability to steal verification codes. Or they may not be actively malicious, and meerly handle the data in an insecure way that makes messages available to others.
Performance, I dunno. Maybe they could argue something about how time between user requesting an SMS be sent and it actually getting sent is very important, and similar for display, and that they're more likely to do that right. I've certainly seen some Android manufacturer provided SMS clients that do much better than others on that, although I have no recent performance notes since I no longer get massive floods of SMS from too simple monitoring systems.
> “The #1 most difficult [reason] to leave the Apple universe app is iMessage ... iMessage amounts to serious lock-in,” was how one unnamed former Apple employee put it in an email in 2016, prompting Schiller to respond that, “moving iMessage to Android will hurt us more than help us, this email illustrates why.”
> “iMessage on Android would simply serve to remove [an] obstacle to iPhone families giving their kids Android phones,” was Federighi’s concern
Apple can't make that argument since they allow apps that scan SMS messages for spam.
To clarify macintux's statement, you can only guarantee end-to-end encryption will both remain secure and allow your messages to be read if you control both ends. If you do not control the other end, but you give it the ability to decrypt your messages (and thus let them be read), then whoever does control the other end can save the plaintext, post it elsewhere, and generally do whatever they want with it.
To be "end-to-end encrypted", something has to actually be a service you are using, not merely a method of encryption. An end-to-end encrypted service could use PGP if it wanted (AFAIK), but PGP, in itself, is just a way for you to encrypt your messages, and then, optionally, share your public key to allow them to be decrypted by those you give it to, while also guaranteeing that those messages came from you (as long as you have kept your private key safe).
So I'm afraid your question, as it stands, doesn't really make sense, but I hope this has helped to answer the underlying questions for you.
That is true both for PGP encrypted messages as well as iMessage messages. There's nothing on iPhones or Macs actually protecting your decrypted messages. Most of the on device security is optional and your messages, photos and files can be copied and shared anywhere in plain text.
The question in this thread is whether iMessage can offer secure interop. The answer is yes. They just need to use an open protocol and that protocol can use tools like PGP to encrypt messages end-to-end.
Your claim that both the sending and receiving application need to be "controlled" by some entity for it to have "real" end-to-end security is non-sense.
The question, from tomrod, was "How does PGP solve this?"
Nothing to do with iMessage. I was answering a specific question on a tangent thread. If you want to argue with me about iMessage, go to one of the posts I've made about that on this article. This thread is about PGP.
I don’t think the government could force them to adopt RCS without new legislation or bring iMessage to other platforms.
Could they not have made their own? I don't think they'd be required to use open standards for the argument to be made, they just need to release an iMessage app for Android.
There's no valid technical or security reason to do this. It's a tactical decision on Apple's part.
Does it ACTUALLY matter? Maybe not? But people really do complain about a non-iPhone "degrading" a group chat, so it is indicating something.
At the time they made iMessage at first? It was likely a real advance and only because they could control both ends. But now? They may be large enough that it's unfair use of their monopoly in one area to affect another, and get slapped or forced to interoperate.
That might be worth letting the user know about it.