It's more morally permissible for corporate decision makers to install a global surveillance complex than for civil servants to attempt to regulate it.
No, it's more transparent. Unlike cookie banners.
If only cookie banners protected the consumer, but shadow cookies work fine.
I don't know if this mini-competition between regulators and companies is truly zero-sum, there could be some way to get everyone something they want. But with the current regulation, it is zero-sum, and the companies are winning and the EU is losing. And the EU "works for you", so of course you can complain to them.
That's an overstatement of the purpose of the regulation IMO. The purpose is to give the user control over the tracking of their data.
* Transparency
* Accountability
* Proportionality
* Consistency
* Targeting
I'm not certain that the GDPR laws fail any of these. I'm guessing pg is getting at something more nebulous to do with how annoying the UX is as a result of the regulation, and whether it encourages civil engagement. But if he'd simply said "EU regulation has made UX annoying" then he wouldn't have such a snappy tweet.
[0] https://www.icaew.com/technical/trust-and-ethics/better-regu...
EDIT I googled some more and found a brochure from the National Audit Office titled "Principles of Effective Regulation": https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Principles...
It does have a statement in there:
> Good regulation maximises the benefits while minimising compliance costs and unintended consequences. The benefits of regulation can be both to wider society (such as improved environmental or safety standards) and to regulated (for example, through increased consumer confidence), but not all of the benefits are necessarily easy to quantify.
Put that way, I can get on board with what pg's saying.
Unfortunately a non-negligible number of people in tech also have libertarian leanings, with a default “gubmint bad!” position, which makes them easy prey for adtech propaganda.
Why is this unfortunate? Because you don't agree with us? The "they would agree with me if they were smarter" trope is tired and gets us nowhere.
GP answered your question, for some reason you decided to cut the quote right before the answer. Here is the part that is missing from your quote which answers your question: '[...]with a default “gubmint bad!” position'
> The "they would agree with me if they were smarter" trope is tired and gets us nowhere.
Personally, I find it very very strange that many of the people who call for regulation as a remedy to perverse incentives manifest in commercial markets seem unwilling to recognize the existence of even more perverse incentives in the political realm. If people seeking profit sometimes do bad things to get it, why would people seeking political power be expected to behave differently?
I say that’s unfortunate
Bad laws boost libertarianism.
At least until you realise what they're doing, then you think they're skeevy corporate toadies with no morals.
Good regulation is regulation that has good outcomes. If a law has bad outcomes it is a bad law. You can separately complain about what companies are doing but that doesn't change the fact that it's a bad law.
It is of course debatable whether GDPR as a whole has bad outcomes, but if we're talking about cookie banners in isolation then it certainly does.
You don't seem to explain what the role of corporations is or what a good corporation looks like. If these things are not symmetric, you need to finish your explanation of why or how they aren't.
Corporations and the whole of property rights only exist because of government protection, so it would be pretty audacious--in my opinion--to assert that corporations have no duty to behave to the benefit of society. I'm not saying that's your claim, but I'm curious as to how close you're willing to get to that claim...
In my opinion it is not audacious at all to reject the idea that corporations should intentionally pursue societal goals or claim to act out of a sense of duty.
Of course we want the effect of what corporations do to be of net benefit to society as a whole. But this cannot be based on their intentions or sense of duty. It has to be based on the systemic effects of them pursuing their own (possibly enlightened) self interest within the framework of the law.
It is for governments to make sure that these effects are beneficial and to intervene when they are not. So the asymmetry I see is that capitalism is a tool of society, not the other way around.
I still find it somewhat silly to reject the idea that a corporation (run by human beings) shouldn't intentionally be evil for the sake of maximizing profit, but I do understand that this is a fairly common Friedman-esque point of view.
But, even so, I guess "duty" was the wrong word for me to use. I more meant that if a corporation does NOT benefit society, we should expect the corporation to stop existing. So, in that sense, there's a "duty" (existential requirement) to benefit society.
> Of course we want the effect of what corporations do to be of net benefit to society as a whole. But this cannot be based on their intentions or sense of duty. It has to be based on the systemic effects of them pursuing their own (possibly enlightened) self interest within the framework of the law. > > It is for governments to make sure that these effects are beneficial and to intervene when they are not. So the asymmetry I see is that capitalism is a tool of society, not the other way around.
I feel like you're circling back around to almost disagree with yourself. Several comments back in this thread someone made a point about "unintended consequences" of the law and applying "game theory" logic to it, and another commenter replied that the companies in question could also have seen the law coming if they misbehaved too badly. That commenter asked if the "game theory" logic shouldn't go both ways, and that we should then blame the corporations for the regulation because the government is just doing what governments do.
You replied that the argument does NOT go both ways because the roles of government and corporations are not symmetric.
But, what you're arguing here seems to be consistent with the view that the "unintended consequences" and "game theory" logic DOES go both ways. You acknowledge that it is a government's duty to intervene when corporations are not benefiting society, and you also say that corporations will pursue their own self-interest within the framework of the law.
I don't mean to put words in your mouth, but the only way I can resolve this asymmetry in my mind is to have a framework where corporations doing things that are bad for society is okay, because the government is supposed to stop them; but if the government is unable to fully stop them from being bad, then it's STILL not the corporation's fault, but the government's...
It just sounds like we've gotten lost in the abstractions of corporations and governments. At the end of the day, these are decisions being made by fellow sentient human beings, and if a corporation's humans make some evil decision, I refuse to let them off the hook with "well, free markets" and "they have no choice but to maximize profits".
On a very general level, the idea is that not every part of a complex system has to incorporate all the principles of the system as a whole. Individual parts of the system can have limited roles and responsibilities. That's fine and it has nothing to do with being evil.
Defense lawyers must defend their clients to the best of their ability whatever horrible things they may have done. Juries, judges, prosecutors, they all have their specific roles to play.
It's the justice system as a whole that should result in justice being done. If everyone involved tried to pursue their own interpretation of generally desirable societal outcomes, the justice system would be unfit for purpose.
And here's the asymmetry again. Those designing the system as a whole have to think about societal outcomes as part of their job (as does every citizen). Those acting in a specific defined role as part of the system can only do that in limited ways or under exceptional circumstances.
Corporations are run by people, but these people act in a limited role that is defined in such a way that pursuing specific societal outcomes does not necessarily boost the likelihood of their personal success or the success of the corporations they run.
If there is a conflict between certain societal outcomes and making a profit then those executives willing to prioritise profits will be the ones running the successful corporations. That's why it's so futile to bet on corporations acting against their self-interest in significant ways. They are systemically incapable of doing that (on average - exceptions are always possible).
That's why I'm saying that if we want to make corporations act in desirable ways, we have to make laws rather than appealing to the conscience of those running the corporations.
>I don't mean to put words in your mouth, but the only way I can resolve this asymmetry in my mind is to have a framework where corporations doing things that are bad for society is okay, because the government is supposed to stop them; but if the government is unable to fully stop them from being bad, then it's STILL not the corporation's fault, but the government's...
The question I'm asking is who can fix a particular issue, and if the issue isn't getting fixed then I'm assigning blame to those whose job it is to fix it.
Corporations collectively can't fix an issue when the only fix is not exploiting a particular economic opportunity. If one corporation stops exploiting the opportunity, another one will.
That said, of course I do blame corporations for stuff all the time. There's nothing wrong with that. Blaming them is sometimes effective consumer power. It can take away the economic opportunity as the reputational damage may outweight the benefits. Blame can also help build momentum for a change in the law.
But if laws are made and they have giant loopholes in them, then I blame lawmakers for doing a shoddy job.
The main problem with GDPR is the scale of non-compliance greatly exceeds the size of any reasonable enforcement capacity, at least until enforcement catches up.