I think the main problem with the article referenced in the submission is that percentages of vulnerabilities change based on the problem domain. The main threat for web facing services isn’t memory safety but that’s because most web facing services already use memory safe languages like JS, Java/JVM, Python, Ruby, or Go. It’s weird to pick Rust for its memory safety for web services. The reason to pick Rust is because you get C/C++ like performance without the memory safety issues. If you don’t need the perf, all the other languages are better choices because you’ll probably move quicker.
It’s interesting that 20% are still memory vulnerabilities. Assuming this is all the same class of attacks on web services, that means 20% of applications do care about perf and have exploitable memory safety issues. Or the methodology is shoddy and they’re comparing different classes of software. Regardless, the premise of the first article is flawed and rife with statistical analysis problems that paint a misleading picture while the response isn’t infusing me with a lot of confidence on the merits and comes off as unnecessarily fanboish trying to stretch for a reason of “but no rust still makes sense”. 70% of vulnerabilities in Chrome are memory safety. This holds for similar classes of software written in c/C++ (eg Windows). There’s a reason all major c/c++ codebases have started getting grass roots and organizational support to transition away as quickly as possible.