BUT that knowledge shouldn’t be used to become complacent to the point that we let things slip, nor should it be used to ignore other indicators that could signal a negative trend.
“And we are seeing why in real time” only plays into that complacency because it suggests that the post-incident acts are the goal, while it used to be that they’re means to a goal, the goal being that they’re not needed in the first place.
In particular, with the door plug, the issue is that they go against best practices that have been established yesteryear (i.e., making them bigger than the hole and plugging from the inside to leverage cabin pressure instead of working against cabin pressure) and that’s aside from the knowledge both inside Boeing and supplier Spirit AeroSystem of quality issues.
On a macro level, there’s a more considerable erosion of aviation safety at play, however, especially in the US. This erosion has only marginally led to increased deaths (albeit preventable) but has significantly increased the level of near-catastrophic events. This, in my humble opinion, is an essential signal in terms of potential future fatalities.
I’m talking about:
- things at the manufacturer level, of which Boeing with their 737 MAX fulfills an emblematic role (e.g., MCAS, door plug, loose bolts, etc); - regulators’ lack of proper enforcement (e.g., FAA being extremely hesitant to ground planes after the MCAS incidents, making them one of the last ones to do so, FAA being extremely deferential in the certification process, allowing Boeing to essentially self-certify most of the essential stuff, if not outright granting them waivers or allowing Boeing to omit information about specific systems from flight manuals); - lacks regulation on crew hours, leading to fatigued crew; - overworked and understaffed ATC; - “safe enough” mentality when it comes to protocols at and around airports to increase the number of movements
The list goes on and on. The common denominator? Money.
It’s cheaper and more expeditious to let Boeing evade proper certification and to let them sell a range of different models under the same type certification.
It’s better for the economy not to ground planes made by America’s darling manufacturer.
It’s cheaper for American airlines to only count the hours the planes’ doors are closed as work hours and to not be too strict with mandatory rest requirements.
It’s cheaper to hire contractors to do ATC and to have one person do a job that would be safer to split amongst 3, especially when it costs more to attract two more people.
It’s cheaper to cram more planes onto a runway than to spread them out; it also makes more money for airlines and airports. So it’s better to have pilots do a visual approach and visual separation; not only does this unload some of the responsibility to the pilots, freeing up ATC resources, but it also requires less separation, which means more movements at the airport. This practice has the blessing of the FAA, by the way, this is straight from the FAA Safety Alert For Operators SAFO 21005[0]. IFALPA, in turn, released a bulletin to highlight how the US practice isn’t in line with ICAO practices and to advise non-US pilots on how to handle this[1].
On their own, none of these might immediately lead to a noticeable effect in aviation safety, but combined, they most certainly do.
For every incident that makes headlines, ten never make it into mainstream news, which hides the significant uptick in near-catastrophic events[2].
So yes, while statically aviation is a safe mode of transport, it doesn’t help to proclaim that “there’s nothing to see here folks, everything is super safe.”
It’s a miracle nobody died in this door plug incident, a straight-up miracle, and not the result of some grand safety design.
Any attempt to paint it as other than a miracle is just confirmation bias.
0: https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/SAFO21005_0.pdf
1: https://ops.group/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/21atsbl04-...
2: https://sfist.com/2023/08/21/close-calls-on-sfo-runways-are-...