I'm sure many people in Boeing really care only about how to get required signoffs with as little effort as possible.
acdha covers the most important ideological obstacle: financialism. Basically, the notion that if you're good at managing money, you're good at managing everything[1]. This is itself an ideological proposition, ironically resembling the late-Soviet tendency to inject "marxist" or "socialist" into every branch of learning, because, well, if you know class dynamics, you know everything.
Some might say, "Regulation is good, we need a very large and meticulous government-managed safety group, because large capital projects with little safety margin require government involvement". The risk here is creating an unnecessarily hostile relationship with industry, which could increase scope until productivity falls below a theoretical floor. This is starting from "regulation is good", and it's going to want to prove the point.
Others might say, "government entities are ipse facto incapable of meeting goals, therefore we need to eliminate or decrease regulation so industry has greater freedom to establish safety practice." The risk here is when industry is operating under a different set of incentives (see, again, acdha's point on financialism), their goals don't align with value (reliability, safety, performance), but rather on the revenue, or even complex derivatives thereof. This is another ideological incentive, but there's a risk of a death spiral: regulation is bad and stupid -> shrink it -> bad things happen -> proof that regulation is bad -> regulation is bad and stupid.
[1] I'd posit that Welchian financialism is actually not even good at making money, over a risk horizon longer than a few years (or even a few quarters), but it's quite good at belching out cash in a very short term.