If companies lose too much money and don't receive bailouts, they simply cease to exist.
And you can't magic a new one on demand, given the specialized expertise and subcontractor requirements for something this complex.
So the reality is the government is stuck with a multi-variable optimization problem -- what combination of price, competition, and sustained R&D/production capability is best?
There is no easy answer. The modern, less-competitive, merged market is a deliberate consequence of the US refusing the spend Cold War levels of money to keep a larger number of manufacturers afloat.
On the one hand, Boeing fucked up the project badly. On the other hand, the contract was written so Boeing ate the $5B+(?) in rework / deficiency remediation.
Acquisition at that level is extremely cutthroat, so who knows what happened.
The broader perspective is that the current major aircraft contracts are:
- F-35 Lockheed-Martin
- B-21 Northrop Grumman
- KC-46 Boeing
- X-37 (Space) Boeing
- MQ-25 (Naval Refueling) Boeing
That seems like a pretty fair spreading of contracts among the remaining majors, especially if you had less faith in Boeing to produce combat equipment, but still wanted to maintain it as a company.They got the contract killed because they knew they could work up a furor about a European design being used by the US. Of course it's fine in the other direction.
There's legitimate reasons to not want to depend on an ally for equipment but in this case it seems that Boeing haven't been able to deliver on it at all. Losing might have been a good kick up the ass to improve for the next time this type of contract comes around.
They've already made noise about 'being more selective about their bids in the future' or some such.
Which is honestly the way it should work. Because the US govt can't reform Boeing. Only Boeing can choose to do that internally.
The people providing oversight were the problem. Any progress here needs to avoid an "another hull on the Titanic" sort of proposal.