Yes. It's an object or writing. Not a person. You're arguing for giving personhood to software right now and that's crazy.
Yes. It's an object or writing. Not a person. You're arguing for giving personhood to software right now and that's crazy.
I'm not sure anyone in the thread is actually arguing that. I think what they are saying is that we should look at what behaviour is considered acceptable for humans in order to help us decide what behaviour is acceptable for the tools humans use.
(I heavily edited this comment after realizing I could make the point in far fewer words. Sorry.)
It's not. That was the point of my replies. That it's time to assert software personhood is crazy.
> If we decide that a certain kind of usage of software shouldn't be considered acceptable, then we could sue the user who used it, or the developers who created it, or something.
We can already do that. That's what this article is about. The people are being sued. That's what all of my replies are about. I don't understand why you are replying to my comment with a re-summary of my comments as if it's a rebuttal to them.
It doesn't. And all of my comments are about that. Like I just said in the previous reply. You're replying to my comment where I also just said this. Please stop replying to me saying that I'm saying that.
The article is about people (well, companies) being sued. Not about software being sued. Software can't be sued.
Whether or not there are additional laws written about what's acceptable behavior for software (whatever that means? It's assuming software can make decisions) is irrelevant. You can't sue software. People are being sued because the plaintiffs think that people broke people laws and are liable for damages. Software can't break laws and can't be held liable.
I'm having to reword this over and over because you keep replying to me. I think you might be replying to me repeatedly just to have the last word.
What would be your financial responsibility to keep AI running?
No, arguing that a human using an artificial brain instead of their own biological brain for learning and derivative creation is an implementation detail of little relevance, and dismissing personhood related arguments like "software can't marry" has nothing to do with arguing for the personhood of software. Explain how one leads to the other, because I'm not seeing it, and that's not at all what I was attempting to communicate.
There is a possibility that you're not saying that, but it's the only interpretation of your comment I could come up with. Because your comment consists entirely of comparisons of software to human brains about whether or not something should be considered legal, and this only makes sense if the software itself can be held liable.
Respectfully, I don't know how you're interpreting it that way. Until we demonstrate that the current generation of AI is genuinely intelligent, instead of clever algorithms, a piece of software is no more or less liable than an individual firearm is after it's been fired at someone. My observation is that your argument appears to be that there is something special about humans learning and creating derivative works from that learning over humans using a tool that does the learning and create derivative works.
> There is a possibility that you're not saying that, but it's the only interpretation of your comment I could come up with.
That's fair. I just don't get it.
> Because your comment consists entirely of comparisons of software to human brains about whether or not something should be considered legal, and this only makes sense if the software itself can be held liable.
Human brains and software are both tools. The question I'm invoking is what is it about a person doing the learning and the derivative creation that's different from a person (since, as you say, software itself has no personhood) using an artificial brain to learn and perform derivative creation.
I think the disconnect here may be that I'm operating from the assumption that of course there are human beings liable for the software, but your interpretation of what I'm saying is that software in a vacuum should effectively have personhood applied to it. These are two different things. I'm referring to both humans/brains and software as the interchangeable variable in the question of why the choice of tool means applying entirely different legal principles.
Sorry if I wasn't clear or still am not being clear here. I wanted to make sure I was being understood correctly, but if all we can do from here is agree to disagree, that's fine, and I'd offer to just shake hands.
There is one other way I have figured out to read your comment. Which is that it doesn't matter how software or a brain functions since it's only the action of the outcome that matters. But this is not really a relevant statement regardless of whether or not you agree with it, because the article is about a lawsuit and liability. A group of people, acting as a company, is suing other groups of people as companies. And software is not a person, and can't be held liable. So for that to be the case, the software would need to be made into a person, or equivalent. The fact that software and brains are or are not similar is irrelevant, because software is not a person and cannot be held liable.