- "Build it simple and then double up on many components so that if one fails the other will take over. Examples are ablative thrust chambers that do not require regenerative cooling; hypergolic propellants that do not require an ignition source; three fuel cells, where one alone could bring the spacecraft back from the moon"
- "Another important design rule, which we have not discussed as often as we should, reads: Minimize functional interfaces between complex pieces of hardware. In this way, two organizations can work on their own hardware relatively independently...The main point is that a single man can fully understand this interface and can cope with all the effects of a change on either side of the interface. If there had been 10 times as many wires, it probably would have taken a hundred (or a thousand?) times as many people to handle the interface." (interesting proposed scaling)
- "Generally, tedious, repetitive tasks are best performed automatically...but the entire rendezvous sequence was designed so that the pilot could always monitor the automatic system's performance and apply a backup solution if deviations were noted."
- "The single most important factor leading to the high degree of reliability of the Apollo spacecraft was the tremendous depth and breadth of the test activity...Most important of all, the tests gave us a tremendous amount of time and experience on the spacecraft and their systems. Such experience -- together with a detailed analysis of all previous failures, discrepancies, and anomalies -- led us to the conclusion that we were ready to fly a lunar orbit with Apollo 8"
- "Throughout Apollo, many discrepancies or failures occurred daily...the result was the same: The failure had to be understood and, if applicable, some corrective action taken.
- "Pay particular attention to what seem minor details, especially for substitute parts and 'explained' failures."