Hacker News Reader

> At yet here we are with nobody having a better plan. The issue is still the same as it has been for the past 20 years: making a (PKI-based) security feature means you can never share the secret parts or make it optional, otherwise it is immediately defeated. You can't have selective security where it works sometimes but not all the times. And trading out that security system is not an option.

This is BS. A security system where the user is not in control of the secret is not a security system but DRM almost by definition. And trading it out is not only an option, but likely the preferred outcome if you ask the majority of buyers.

Quite a lot of people have a bonafide fear of their phone being stolen, especially when travelling and so on.

It seems you have no clue what you are talking about. A PKI where the CA private key is not secret is not really a PKI now is it?

As for asking buyers: I doubt 0.001% of buyers in any market segments has a clue about PKI or public key cryptography at all. This is E2EE "lets have a government back-door" all over again: IT DOES NOT WORK. The Clipper chip was not that log ago, now was it?

> A PKI where the CA private key is not secret is not really a PKI now is it?

At the end of the day, _you_ are the one in control of the list of CAs that you trust. If you are, it is (maybe) security. If you aren't, it is DRM. This is a simple rule with surprisingly little grey areas. See eIDAS...

> I doubt 0.001% of buyers in any market segments has a clue about PKI

Does it really matter how is the DRM implemented? They don't want to hear about Apple DRMing iPhone repairs, end of story.

PKI is also not the only way to implement this.

You are confusing browser TLS and the trusted CA list with general CA in terms of PKI. So no, you are not in control and there is no list.

> Does it really matter how is the DRM implemented?

If you want to argue semantics instead of facts and merit: yes.

> PKI is also not the only way to implement this.

Yes it is. Unless you have some novel method you are about to disclose to the world, in which case, please do, because you'd have the equivalent of a cryptographic holy grail.

> And trading it out is not only an option, but likely the preferred outcome if you ask the majority of buyers.

I’d bet if you ask the majority of buyers they wouldn’t know and wouldn’t care.

> And trading out that security system is not an option.

Why not? iPhones are premium tech-fashion items that attract criminals due to their value. Apple is trying to negate the value of the stolen item through DRM, but it seems perfectly reasonable for someone to say "the solution is worse than the problem", and opt to buy devices that don't implement hardware DRM on e.g. their screens.

> so far the amount of realistic and effective solutions are NONE.

I'm not sure this is true...I've travelled a fair bit, and my approach to managing theft of my belongings is to limit the value of what I carry. This both limits the incentive for criminals (a $30 Tracphone is much less interesting than a $1000 iPhone) and limits the damage/cost-to-recover in the case of theft.

I don't think I've touched on on theft as much as everyone else here seems to do, but in either case I'd still put that under the 'trustworthy to a degree' umbrella. I want to trust that a device in a known state behaves in a known way. Or as some other people might perceive it: the thing should work and adversaries should not be able to make it un-work with great ease.

This is something you could split up into multiple fractions:

- Making theft less lucrative to the thief (by reducing the use to non-owners)

- Making theft less impactful to the owner (by making non-owners not have access to the data)

- Making interdiction and malware an expensive endeavour (by making it very expensive to modify the device without the owner knowing about it)

Considering people may not want a $30 trackphone, but they just want their iPhone, the option of changing their behaviour is much less likely to be something Apple will invest in, and thus they invest in other things instead, like platform security. So if you assume that a consumer buys an iPhone because they want to, and assuming they want Apple to take care of making them not an easy target, we get into the current situation.

You can also tack on the 'haha apple expensive repairs they hate everyone' but there are much cheaper ways (for apple) to achieve that as a stand alone proposition. I'm sure they don't mind the fat profits they get, even if it were just a side-effect, but I'm personally and professionally more concerned with the three points I listed earlier than anything else.

Every people talking about theft security and counterfeit prevention is simply getting the point wrong.

If "counterfeit prevention" system is complaining about a genuine part that literally came off of another genuine product, that's not its actual job.

If "anti-theft" system is trying to wrestle with the legitimate owner trying to fix their own product, that's not anti-theft, or rather, the owner is not you. The owner is Apple, and that's precisely what the article says.

The "security" here is protecting Apple's bottom line by ensuring you buy a new product for otherwise fixable damages.

Just because it's somehow more secure doesn't mean it's better for the consumer in any way.

None of your points stand.

Counterfeit prevention is not just some sort of 'this part is real but this other part is not', it is about system integrity. How do we in the world of technology prove integrity? With cryptography. It's the only thing we have.

Same with your anti-theft proposition: if anyone can do whatever they want with my device, then nobody is deterred from stealing it.

Same with security in the sense of interdiction, injection or extraction.

None of these items, not a single one, can work without public-key cryptography. And until you (or someone else) comes up with a system where that does work, none of this matters and the status-quo remains as-is.

And yes, all of this is better for the consumer, even if the 10 people who want to fiddle with their phone can't do that without losing features. If you want a hackable device, get something else.

I, for one, do not want just a device where practically anyone can manipulate it, even if that means I cannot manipulate myself it either.

If you cannot come up with an argument that preserves integrity you don't really have a point.

> if anyone can do whatever they want with my device, then nobody is deterred from stealing it.

did i say "anyone" should be able to change components? i didnt say anybody should be able to change components.

> If you want a hackable device, get something else.

iphone is a device made by human, iphone is already hackable (case in point, iphone usb-c mod or headphone jack mod). it's just that apple's lawyers would very much not have that.

you just throw words like public key cryptography like it's an axiom but the tool serves its purpose as much as it's useful to us. you not caring about repairability doesn't matter, you're not apple anyway. people who got told their iphone cannot be recovered by apple but did get their data back thru 3rd party, does. (spoiler: it's because this means apple lied about their product)

> did I say

Not with so many words, but that is what your security model implies. You also haven't reported your other means with which you can ensure platform integrity so I think you don't actually know enough about this topic.

> iphone is a device made by human, iphone is already hackable

Let's assume your statement is valid, doesn't that mean you have nothing to complain about? If you already have what you want, then why are you here?