... and each of you knows that each of you has this same contract ...
“To encourage adherence to its common scheme, RealPage explains that for its services to be most effective in increasing rents, lessors must accept the pricing at least 80% of the time,” according to the suit.
That being said, it absolutely is referenced:
> RealPage actively polices Defendants’ agreement to ensure compliance.
> This data includes the rents that Defendant Landlords actually charge, providing RealPage with a mechanism for assessing whether Landlords “cheat” on their agreement by deviating from the rent dictated by RealPage’s RM Software.
> Their agreement is reflected in existing documents, has been publicly acknowledged by cartel members, and is closely policed to ensure compliance.
> Deviations from the RealPage-generated rent are referred to as “overrides.” Consistent with their agreement to impose rents generated by RealPage RM Software nearly all the time, Defendants agreed to limit overrides. For example, a RealPage LRO training document states: “Overrides should be few and far between.” Similarly, internal RealPage LRO training documents teach cartel members’ regional managers to beware of “Override Overload” or “rogue” leasing agents who too frequently override the LRO-generated pricing.
> An internal presentation created by Defendant Greystar explicitly acknowledges that RealPage RM Software users should each seek to accept at least 95% of the RealPage-generated prices, emphasizing that “Discipline [o]f using revenue management increases more consistent outcomes.”
> Former Greystar employees have similarly confirmed that negotiating rents other than those set by the RealPage RM Software was unacceptable.
> Even where Participating Landlords do not enable auto-accept, most landlords cannot, on their own, charge rents other than those generated by RealPage’s RM Software— landlords can only “propose an override.” The landlord must then provide a written business justification for why they wish to depart from the RealPage-generated rent.
Sounds like it's very much in the lawsuit. I'm not sure how you come to any other conclusion. It's a core tenet across multiple pages of it. In your previous comment you try to imply it's just "encouraged". And now you're making statements that are demonstrably incorrect (and I found those examples with less than five minutes of skimming the court complaint, so it's hard to imagine how you missed them all).
If a subset of companies use the exact same algorithm for price discovery, is there a form of price-fixing? This is the key question being argued.
If the courts rule against Realpage, then any form of algorithmic price discovery en-masse could be found to be anti-competitive.
This might mean you can't use TheTradeDesk and Google Adsense en-masse for example.
Basically, as of today, a lot of price discovery is now automated by a majority of companies using a handful of vendors for this.
To me at least, what the algorithm is doing doesn't actually matter.
What actually matters is whether a set of players using a singular algorithm can count as price fixing or not.
Like is that coordination or not? This is a fundamental question for the entire API industry, ML Industry, and any other industry dependent on algorithms.
Algorithm A - professionally_evaluated_price + inflation
Algorithm B - average_price_of_cohort_you_agreed_to_join + 0.01
The first algorithm is super simple and is conceivably how many landlords might do it anyway and is based on value of your goods. Everyone using it wouldn't raise prices or hurt consumers. The second algorithm is basically agreeing with a cohort that you will never undercut each other and slowly raise prices. This obviously hurts renters and raises prices.
So at that point, it's not the algorithm, but the cohort that's at fault of price fixing. So is there proof that you joined a cohort? Does using the same software count as joining a cohort?
>The software company actively "polices" landlords to ensure that they comply with the rent cost it generates, the lawsuit alleges. Failure to impose the RealPage rents could lead to landlords being expelled from the organization, according to the suit.
> RealPage's software has set the rent at more than 30% of apartments in multifamily buildings in D.C. and 60% of units in large multifamily buildings, per the lawsuit. The percentages are even higher for the broader D.C. metro area.
But you can claim collusion because the parties are sharing information with and broadly following the recommendations of a single company.