If your computer is infected, I don't want to talk to you for a month. If it continues to be infected, I might up that to a year, or permanently ban you.
It's your problem. Go fix it.
I would greatly prefer not having my semi-randomized IP blocked because someone used it maliciously a year ago.
If anybody is suggesting permanent bans of IPs, it's not me, at least not at a public level. I may very well choose privately to do that.
To clarify, I, personally chooses a blacklist policy. Not some other org. I think if you offload this onto any kind of external structure, it breaks again.
ADD: We make publicly-available, second-by-second, how the internet is broken and invite all comers, including me and my blocklist, to help fix it.
There's a huge commerical interest in NOT fixing the problem of random crap showing up, from dancing cats selling things to targeted inserted ads. I get it. We saw this same thing happen with adblockers. It's now going on with "free" VPNs. Can't fight that perverse incentive, so don't fight it.
The problem is that ISPs whose customers are originating the attacks from don’t give a shit.
If we have to give up 1% of legitimate traffic to thwart 90% of attacks, it is a good deal.
If you and other customers complain to your ISP (or switch), eventually they’ll do something about it.
We can’t seriously keep on accepting that « thousands of compromised devices » is a fine reality for a « small botnet ».
These devices should be quarantined.
I don't even want to think about the ramifications for small and medium sized businesses. Realistically, how much would it cost to be able to completely destroy a local competitor by paying someone to orchestrate a few events in succession.
As I understand your argument, because the net has solid endpoints we can identify and isolate, we should ignore that fact. Instead we should create more and more complex systems to work around bad actors?
Bad actor takes control of grandma's computer. We should do all sorts of things except stop talking to grandma's computer? The thing, I would suspect, that most people would expect?
Businesses suffer from too much transparency. Got that part. They buy things that don't work and sometimes hurt people, even if they don't intend to do this. So far, so good. Where is the part where new businesses models are supposed to exist because some people made bad choices and the current models don't work? Why don't we just publicize the bad choices and let things work themselves out?
Sorry. Missing it.
Guess who has more votes, you or Amazon.
My personal want / solution would simply be "everything gets an IPV6, and IPV4 gets deprecated. Everything using IPV4 gets an algorithm slapped on top to covert it into IPV6.
Dynamic ips become a thing of the past.
But I realize that is significantly easier said than done. (Makes Minecraft servers easier to setup though)
Every reasonable connectivity provider would pay attention to this info, or face intense complaints from its users with shared and dynamic IPs. It would identify sources of attacks, and block them at higher granularity level, reporting that the range has been cleared. (If a provider lied, everyone would stop believing it, and the disgruntled customers would leave it.)
For shared hosting providers it would mean blocking specific user accounts using a firewall, notifying users, and maybe even selling cleanup services.
For home internet users, it also would mean blocking specific users, contacting them, helping them identify the infected machine at home.
It would massively drive patching of old router firmware which is often cracked and infected. Same for IoT stuff, infected PCs, malicious apps on phones, etc. There would be an incentive to stay clean.
And yes, we can block entire subnets. You own the IP addresses, you're responsible for stuff coming out of them, at least to the degree that it's not maliscious to the web as a whole. (but not the content itself, of course)
I'm calling bullshit on these assumptions. The internet is a communications tool. If it's not communicating, it's broken. If you provide dynamic IPs to clients that attack people, you're breaking it. It's not my problem or something I should ever be expected to pay for.
To be clear, my point is that we're suggesting yet another layer of commercial, paid crap on top of a broken system in order to fix it. It'd be phenomenally better just to publicly identify place and methods where it's broken and let other folks with more vested interests than information consumers worry about it. Hell, I'm not interested in paying for the current busload of bytes I'm currently consuming for every one sentence of value I receive.
One of the things that gets lost in this kind of debate is that the vast, vast majority of Internet users are not experts in how the Internet, computers, or their phones work. So expecting them to be able to "just not get exploited" is a naive strategy and bringing the pain to the ISP feels counterproductive because what, realistically, can they do to stop all of their unsophisticated users from getting themselves exploited?
At the end of the day, the vast majority of the users of the Internet do not care how it works - they want their email, they want their cat videos, and they want to check up on their high school ex on Facebook. How can we rearchitect the Internet to be a) open b) privacy protecting, and c) robust against these kinds of attacks so that the targets of DDOS attacks have better protection than paying a third party and hoping that that third party can protect them?
> We might fix this, we might not, you DONT have a choice.
> Thank you for your continued business.
(swap in any corpo-service provider you personally like the most)
Blanket banning subnet ranges from services because of the actions of someone else is 3rd world shit.
(not to mention the number of false positives you'd get, etc etc)
There is no need for any central authority and no need to maintain any lists.
If you store 1 bit (banned/unbanned) + a unix timestamp (ban expiration) for each of those IPs, that requires more storage space than exists many billion times over.
To store such a block table you propose would require more memory for routers than any router has ever had and ever will have.
An attacker could easily "flush" all entries in this table by, for example, banning a TB of ipv6 addresses from talking to them, surely resulting in all participating routers dropping other bans to store some of those.
For example, if an attack is coming from a country you where you don't have many paying customers, but where there are many infected devices due to use of pirated outdated software, it is easier to ban the whole country than to figure out who is infected and who is not.
We can set a limit of ban records per host to prevent it.
Is there a reason other than inertia for why it hasn’t been implemented?
And the other ISPs like getting paid for DDoS mitigation, so they also look the other way. There's no money to be made fixing the underlying problem.