Fortunately, that one is not quite the case – the aviation industry is incredibly safety-conscious and does not allow relying on GPS exclusively.
For both en-route navigation and landing, every plane will have at least one fallback system available (usually ground-based radionavigation aides such as VORs or DMEs or inertial navigation systems, which is also what was used for navigation during ocean crossings before there was GPS), and in fact, these other systems are seeing more use than you might assume: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17987/usaf-is-jamming-...
https://www.gpsworld.com/what-happened-to-gps-in-denver/
The advisory also said the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and
Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS), both designed to make
navigation with GPS more precise, as well as the ADS-B collision
avoidance and traffic management system, would be unreliable.
Pilots reported other systems affected such as transponders that help
radar controllers keep track of aircraft, traffic alert and collision
avoidance (TCAS) equipment, autopilots, electronic flight bags and
terrain warning systems.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/faa-warns... Flights into the Dallas area are being forced to take older,
cumbersome routes and a runway at Dallas-Fort Worth International
Airport was temporarily closed after aviation authorities said GPS
signals there aren’t reliable.
https://rntfnd.org/2022/10/18/faa-warns-airline-pilots-as-gp... Stanford researchers have determined that the interference event
lasted 24 hours, though it took the air traffic system another 20
hours to reset and recover.
From another incident:https://www.gpsworld.com/nasa-report-passenger-aircraft-near...
A report filed with NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System and
published in June outlines how a passenger aircraft flew off course
during a period of GPS jamming and nearly crashed into a
mountain. Fortunately, an alert radar controller intervened, and the
accident was averted.https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/at...
https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia/index.php/GBAS_Fundamentals
https://aerospace.honeywell.com/us/en/products-and-services/...
Even for "plain" (i.e. unaugmented) GPS, there's countermeasures, starting from simple physical ones (e.g. directional antennas leveraging the fact that GPS satellites are usually located above the airplane and not below or inside it), up to complicated logical filters checking all inputs for plausibility and rejecting suspicious signals and resulting position fixes.
Galileo even supports message authentication, which thwarts everything other than (very sophisticated) real-time signal relaying attacks: https://berthub.eu/articles/posts/galileos-authentication-al...
https://www.cnet.com/culture/truck-driver-has-gps-jammer-acc...
(aware of military receivers that can receive jam resistant signal, but that is not what commercial applications have access to)
The possibility of a large-scale GPS outage or jamming event is definitely a threat scenario that's being considered by aviation safety agencies. For example, here's the FAA's approach for en-route navigation redundancy, which includes maintaining enough VORs to ensure that there's at least one within every 100 nautical miles: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/at...
Yes, denying augmented GPS capabilities will probably impact operational efficiency significantly, but it shouldn't endanger safety.
Sure, I believe that in the air, GPS is redundant. But what Kelsey explained is that, before GPS and graphical maps, pilots on the ground would rely on paper charts that were manually updated and placed in huge binders. They would scour these paper charts to understand what taxiways they needed to take across the airport to get from gate to runway and back again.
Nowadays, the pilots have a nice screen where an image of the airport is displayed underneath a nice arrow depicting the aircraft in its GPS location and velocity. It's more difficult to get lost now, because you can see at a glance on the screen where you are. Looking outside your windows can often confuse, and fog and darkness and unfamiliarity can confound someone who is already lost.
The issue on 74 Gear was that someone got lost and thought they were in an entirely different location, when actually they had intruded on an active runway while just trying to taxi. A very dangerous situation, as you can tell.
I believe that, if GPS were jammed and unavailable, pilots would possibly be able to fall back on these paper charts, that is, if they are even being maintained anymore, but it would be error-prone, and any taxiing pilot would need to exercise utmost caution not to get lost like that.
Regarding the runway incursion scenarios, you need to pay attention to the lights on the taxiways, because runway entries are highly illuminated and visible even in really low visibility conditions. You just don't enter an active runway by mistake.
"Paper charts" as you call them, are physical charts of airpots maps akin to a city map. And as a pilot you are required to know how to read and use those maps. Just as with SID/STAR charts. Pilots are expected to know how to fly using only basic instruments (airspeed, altitude, attitude, vertical speed, compass, banking), and even with some of those not operational.
Long story short, GPS jamming at an airport is an inconvenience rather than something critical.
There is definitely responsibility on the pilots to not take a wrong turn, and that job gets harder without precision navigation systems, but more than one thing normally has to go wrong for a runway incursion to occur, as far as I understand.
This means that the standard movie-plot methods of hijacking aircraft are ridiculously easy to carry out: just bring weapons on a plane. There's only a 50% chance you get caught.
This means approximately no one wants to hijack airliners.
Between TSA missing most weapons while compulsively stealing cash, travelers would be far safer from genuine harm if the the agency didn't exist.
ref: https://reason.com/2021/11/19/after-20-years-of-failure-kill...
ref: https://duckduckgo.com/?q=tsa+seizes+cash
I just learned: It seems that state efforts to maximize gun possession have led to so many guns in airports - even TSA agents are starting to find them.
ref: https://www.forbes.com/sites/suzannerowankelleher/2022/11/01...
I was blown away with my first First-Class flying experience. You go through all this TSA security theater, and then they hand you a real metal steak knife and glass stemware shortly after take off.
You don't even need to bring weapons, they give them to you.
TSA stuff is all for show. It makes some people feel safer that they had to take off their belt or something...
You probably don't even need bullets honestly, just the visual aid.
You don't even need a gun though, a knife is plenty lethal on it's own and readily available inside the terminal and even on the plane.
Have you seen the kinds of people they put in that job? The whole thing is a farce.
I didn't ask for it back.
The bad guys know this: they figure an attempt to do a 9/11-style hijacking will result in failure and death without doing damage to anything but the plane itself. No flying into the Capitol or the Pentagon in a blaze of glory.
Americans won't see the enemy which is staring at us. Domestically it will have to get a lot worse over the next decade.
the hijack to end all hijacks?
Apart of some war zones or crime holes the world is quite safe and hospitable in general if one doesn't do stupid mistakes or really ask for problems. Every society has some form of agreed laws which try to correct a harmful behavior against them.
Accidental radio interference or setting fire can happen out of simple stupitidy or incompetence.
July 4th consistently has the highest amount of human-caused wildfire. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/USA-JULY4/FIREWORKS/klvygax...
Terror Cell can't afford First Class? Just walk to one of the restaurants inside the terminal and take a steak knife before you get on the plane.
The TSA shenanigan's are wild... security theater on an entirely different level.
So with the example of the 9/11 attacks, the situation has changed enough that a plane hijacking with a knife is much more unlikely
I'd actually expect a plane to the one of the absolute safest places, because like others said, everyone on that place has just become a victim. It doesn't even matter if you like the person being victimized, you're gonna exploit that distraction and beat the fuck out of the dude.
In public people are much quicker to just run away and keep themselves safe.
I liked a comment a few days ago about hostile actors on the internet versus meatspace:
"I asked about the security systems governing walking around in the hallway - was there any physical impediment preventing one person from punching, kicking, throwing a rock at another? Of course not - the security is socially constructed. Norms, consequences, etc, that on balance seemed to work out pretty effectively. I tried to make a case that security inside a local network of the size and scope of our school board was also ~90% social construction, but the student really struggled with it. There was a strong belief that because it was computers, you were expected to exploit it if it were vulnerable."
(Not saying you’re lying, I just want to learn more!)
For GSM, basic IMSI sniffing: https://github.com/Oros42/IMSI-catcher (usable with cheap SDRs)
For LTE, basic IMSI sniffing: https://github.com/JiaoXianjun/LTE-Cell-Scanner (usable with cheap SDRs)
For LTE, full-on sniffing of all unencrypted metadata: https://github.com/SysSec-KAIST/LTESniffer (generally requires fancy SDRs with GPSDO)
Can vouch that the first and second repos definitely worked as of about a year ago, but haven't personally tried since then. I don't have a USRP X310 (yet!) so can't personally speak to the fancy one.
I know my Canadian SIM card somehow hides US providers from network scans, possibly with some geo or if/then rules (but visible from my EU SIM that tries its darnedest to latch onto the US networks and avoid the Canadian ones at all costs)
The way I see it, seems law enforcement agencies using stingrays have a vested interesting in seeing 2G alive and well.