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Nobody is here to defend child pornography or terrorism. But even accepting that they exist, those are a drop in the literal ocean of use cases for encryption relative to the overwhelmingly legal and productive and often necessary uses.
> They should come up with a useful alternative
We have a useful alternative - criminal laws. Make the criminal penalty a strong enough deterrent and you'll stop everyone except the most craven malfeasors (and those people will find ways to continue to disseminate their materials irrespective of encryption status).
Rather than accuse privacy supporters of being "stubborn", you should come up with a legitimate argument why ordinary, law abiding people should have to sacrifice their autonomy in service of an effectively phantom boogeyman.
I.e. using encryption is never illegal, but if you commit a crime and directly employ encryption as a means to commit that crime, your sentence is doubled or whatever.
(inb4 pedantic "all internet services use encryption", which I don't think a court would buy if this is meant to be an add-on charge)
I'm on the other side. IMO; CP is used more and more as an excuse to pass more anti-privacy agenda, because it is difficult to argue against "We want to protect children". That perspective moves discussion to a different place where it is difficult to discuss. Why can't we have both? Is only way to prevent CP eliminating privacy?
Simple as!
Also see terrorism
But I suspect it's a relatively tiny, albeit terrible, problem compared to breaking encryption, which isn't just about privacy but about every action over the internet.
I don't see that you can have it both ways; secure encryption and being able to inspect traffic. There's no alternative so it's either using other mechanisms to go after CSE and terrorist material, as currently happens allowing us to know about the scourge, or we may as well revert to everything being on http.
"Your right to prevent incitement to violence does not exceed my right to free speech. To have it otherwise is to live in a panopticon."
It factually does exceed that right and that fact does not yield a panopticon.
Poor analogy. The panopticon analogy was to relate the fact that allowing inspection of every single message sent by everyone ever is a panopticon. Preventing someone from speaking doesn't equate to a panopticon.
I am very concerned for the worldviews of people who genuinely think it's a good idea to let the government (and consequently, any entity with moderately-skilled hackers and a motive to mass collect data) view every message sent between private parties.
So I'll reiterate, I guess.
No, it doesn't.
Get a warrant for what exactly? On, say, an iPhone where you can have reasonably secured encryption-at-rest for your data (the entire disk is encrypted using an AES key that is protected by your passcode and that key is destroyed after too many failed attempts), simply getting a warrant to take physical possession of the device doesn’t really provide any evidentiary value. In the US and many other jurisdictions (but not the UK from what I recall), courts generally can’t compel someone to reveal their passcode. The E2E keys are stored encrypted at rest as well.
like, will you allow me to drive a car, or eat beef, or own a kitchen knife?
Strong encryption is the foundation of pretty much all online commerce. Without it little else is practical online. It's not up to the EFF to come up with solutions to made up or exaggerated issues.
And the "terrorist propaganda" part doesn't make sense. Propaganda is useless if it doesn't reach an audience, and encryption is all about restricting the audience. I mean, didn't ISIS put up its propaganda videos on Youtube? They're hardly trying to hide it out of sight.