Ok, no "outrage" here @somenits. This is a variation on a "bad bank" scheme that normally is suggested only where jettisoning the toxic liabilities from the main entity will facilitate a government bailout of the resulting "bad bank". That's what makes the scheme work, normally. There isn't a bailout on the way for J+J's bad bank, and the closest suggestion of any value-creation from the manuver comes from disassociating the consumer brand from consumer injuries they allegedly caused. However, that doesn't sound like a compelling case for such a remarkable corporate manuver.

So then, what we are left with is a "bad bank" scheme that is devoid of a compelling legitimate justification, which you yourself do not offer. This naturally raises an inference that J+J hopes to cram down tort claims via the maneuver. Perhaps the cram-down is in administrative overhead associated with litigation. Maybe it's some kind of mismatch in claim acceptance or approval criteria. None of the materials explain, and while I adore Matt's writing the bottom line is it looks like a shell game and that's from someone with no "outrage" whatever involved.

Would you have preferred I refer to a shell game rather than "three card monte." I do confess some ignorance of street hustle lingo. Or, maybe the street people have already switched to simply calling it the "bad bank game?"