J&J is not "freed from the shackles of any liability", because it is still liable to its own subsidiary for the talc lawsuit claims, up to the full value of J&J itself (the parent company).
The decision not to cut dividends in the face of an earnings shock is a pretty common one and not generally a sign of an executive team attempting to enrich themselves. It's more of a sign to shareholders that the executive team has faith in the robustness of the business, which helps if the goal is to survive the present difficulties.
This is an extremely perverse incentive and shows how fundamentally broken some of these mechanics are.
"You injured me, and need to compensate me. But in order to do so I have to hope you continue to prosper, potentially injuring others along the way, so I get my compensation. I can choose between getting you shut down, but potentially not being compensated, or being compensated but knowing that you go on to be able to do this to others."
So then, what we are left with is a "bad bank" scheme that is devoid of a compelling legitimate justification, which you yourself do not offer. This naturally raises an inference that J+J hopes to cram down tort claims via the maneuver. Perhaps the cram-down is in administrative overhead associated with litigation. Maybe it's some kind of mismatch in claim acceptance or approval criteria. None of the materials explain, and while I adore Matt's writing the bottom line is it looks like a shell game and that's from someone with no "outrage" whatever involved.
It is a reality in some licensed industries (eg banking)in Europe