You know - sometimes, just sometimes - it is also to do with protecting organisations from careless or malicious users. The three points are related to security, even it couched in terms of parents/children
So what? There can be multiple ways to compromise security and it’s not like we only solve the easiest ways and leave the rest.
While there are easier ways today, when those get patched this will one day be the easiest.
So there is nothing to solve or patch here. You could get ios if you want user to not have that power(even there it isn't very hard to install malicious accessibility app through sideloading).
There are two cases where this is true: a user intentionally sharing internal access with external malicious actors, or a user unintentionally sharing internal access with external malicious actors (e.g. social engineering / general incompetence). Neither apply to kiosk breakouts.
To expand on this, we can if we choose classify all parental controls under general access control, and within a principle of least privilege further classify the following as legitimate security risks: - access to the internet - access to a keyboard - read access to a disk
There are absolutely scenarios one can contoct where these are real concerns. The settings panel of a general-purpose consumer device doesn't fit that venn diagram for me. Is it a bug: yes. Is it a security bug: no.
Most security scenarios came about as a result of attackers being able to bring systems into absurd situations, and moving systems through unintended pathways.
"Reductio ad absurdum" could apply to most digital exploits before they've happened. "Why would the system get into that state?"
That's a key difference between physical security and digital security:
- In a physical situation, I need to worry about what a typical criminal trying to break into my home or business might do. That requires reasonable measures.
- In digital security, I need to worry about what the most absurdly creative attacker on the internet might do (and potentially bundle up as a script / worm / virus / etc.). I do need to worry about scenarios which might seem absurd for physical security.
If you engineer classifying only "reasonable" scenarios as security risks, your system WILL eventually be compromised, and there WILL be a data leak. That shift in mind set happened around two decades ago, when the internet went from a friendly neighborhood of academics to the wild, wild west, with increasingly creative criminals attacking systems from countries many people in America have never heard of, and certainly where cross-border law enforcement is impractical.
I've seen people like you design systems, and that HAS led to user harm and severe damages to the companies where they worked. At this point, this should be security 101 for anyone building software.
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/risk-management/introduci...
The odds of any individual crafting a special packet to crash my system are absurdly low.
However, "absurdly low" is good enough. All it took was one individual to come up with the ping-of-death and one more to write a script to automate it, and systems worldwide were being taken down by random teenagers in the late nineties.
As a result of these and other absurd attacks, any modern IP stack is hardened to extreme levels.
In contrast, my house lock is pretty easy to pick (much easier than crafting the ping-of-death), and I sometimes don't even remember to lock it. That's okay, since the threat profile isn't "anyone on the internet," but is rather limited (to people in my community who happen to be trying to break into my house).
I don't need to protect my home against the world's most elite criminals trying to break in, since they're not likely to be in that very limited set of people. I do any software I build.
That applies both to system threats and to component threats. Digital systems need to be incredibly hard.
Google used to know that too. I'm not sure when they unlearned that lesson.
1) Cost of compromise.
- For example, medical data, military secrets, and highly-personal data need a high level of security.
- Something like Sudoku high scores, perhaps not so much.
2) Benefit of compromise. Some compromises net $0, and some $1M.
- Something used by 4B users (like Google) has much higher potential upside than something used by 1 user. If someone can scam-at-scale, that's a lot of money.
- Something managing $4B of bitcoin or with designs for the F35 has much higher upside than something with Sudoku high scores.
3) Exposure.
- A script I wrote which I run on my local computer doesn't need any security. It's like my bedroom door.
- A one-off home, school, or business-internal system is only exposed to those communities, and doesn't need to be excessively hardened. It's more-or-less the same as physical security.
- Something on the public internet needs a lot more.
This, again, speaks to number of potential attackers (0, dozens/hundreds, or 7B).
#1 and #2 are obvious. #3 is the one where I see people screw up with arguments. Threats which seem absurdly unlikely are exploited all the time on the public internet, and intuition from the real world doesn't translate at all.
Having is having glass windows (at least at street level).
Whether it's a risk worth addressing depends on a lot of specifics.
For example, a CSRF attack on something like sharepoint.business.com could be externally exploited with automated exploits. That brings you to the 7B attacker scenario, and if the business has 100,000 employees, likely one of them will hit on an attack.
A CSRF attack on a custom application only five employees know about has decent security-by-obscurity. An attacker would need to know URLs and similar business-internal information, which only five people have access to. Those five people can just as easily walk into the CEOs office and physically compromise the machine.
What about protecting users from careless or malicious organisations?