Part of the problem is that this isn't as fungible as economics leads us to believe.
If some working class knob will lose his home, then it's often enough to just offer him twice as much as the home is worth (maybe with helping him find another equivalent home). Such a person knows that it's a good deal, and they end up better off for it. Any perceived reluctance is often just a negotiating tactic, and can be quickly resolved by making the bargain sweeter.
But if Sterling Fitzbillionaire has a mansion with the most beautiful and exclusive view of the shoreline has to put up with an offshore windmill... there's literally no amount of money that makes up for him losing this. You could offer him $10 trillion, and the money is worthless because the mansion with that view is rare enough (or even unique) that money can't buy him another one like it with an unspoiled view. You've reached the fungibility limits of money/property.
Say whatever you want about greed or spitefulness, there is a much more fundamental issue going on here, and it doesn't seem very tractable. It's only aggravated by the plain fact that such people are often in much more influential positions, if not in political offices outright.
The best I can come up with is by disallowing the vetoes entirely, unless they are accompanied by some counter-offer that outlines what would be required for them to withdraw it. Wouldn't matter so much whether the terms were absurd (or seemingly impossible), by forcing them to draft those, it might shift their mindset enough that negotiations (however troubled) could commence. I'm not certain this works, you'd have to run the experiment. I think it might solve some minor fraction of these issues, maybe that improvement's better than nothing.