Where did you get the idea that Apple and Google's implementations are hardware-bound?
https://hachyderm.io/@rmondello/110329118270492669
Apple's existing password manager (which is what surfaces passkey management) lets you export and import the database as a CSV file, same as Google and many others. I suspect the biggest missing piece is an agreement on an interoperable format - likely one that would also be interoperable for password and TOTP exchange as well.
The private key is both kept in your phone’s Secure Enclave and stored in iCloud, so strictly speaking the implementation isn’t hardware-bound in that case.
But I think the intended point is something more practical: can you, as a user, export the passkey to be shared on your non-Apple laptop, phone, etc? And maybe I’m mistaken, but I’ve been under the impression that you cannot.
I'm the author of the blogpost. You are spot on, Passkeys are exportable so the private key ends up both on iCloud and the Enclave/authenticator.
My understanding is that there's chatter about cross-vendor synchronization of passkeys but nothing concrete yet.
Meanwhile Apple allows people to share Passkeys via AirDrop (Settings > Passwords - select the passkey you want and click the "Share" icon to send it over Airdrop) so it should be possible with some effort to obtain the private key with something like this: https://github.com/seemoo-lab/opendrop. Haven't done extensive testing yet though, so I can't confirm.
Would love to hear if anybody knows more about how the sharing via AirDrop is implemented/protected.
I'm the author of the SlashID blogpost. You are right, the WebAuthn standard doesn't provide any guarantees on the authenticator storage security hence passkeys (and WebAuthn creds) can be stored in anything that speaks CTAP2.
We wrote a follow-up blogpost talking about the threat model in which we touch on the above: https://www.slashid.dev/blog/passkeys-security-implementatio...