Banks don't work that way any more because it's a really bad way to run a bank.
Banks don't work that way any more because it's a really bad way to run a bank.
> "The roots of the S&L crisis lay in excessive lending, speculation, and risk-taking driven by the moral hazard created by deregulation and taxpayer bailout guarantees."
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sl-crisis.asp
This is why a lot of people worry that Silicon Valley Bank, First Republic, etc. might be the tip of an iceberg. If they've all leveraged themselves on risky speculation bets in the hopes that they'll get bailouts if it all goes sour (even though depositors greatly exceeded FDIC insurance limits) then you could have a domino situation.
Note also that it's a perfectly good way to run a bank as long as you don't get greedy and go for big risky bets, but the only way to ensure bank managers don't get the Las Vegas bug is to enforce the banking regulations in a fairly strict manner.
While interest rates going up as much as they did may have seemed unlikely, it was still irresponsible not to hedge their risk.
So sure, small banks failing to hedge is irresponsible, but at a large enough scale, someone holds the bag.
Is something similar not possible with interest rates? I imagine for instance someone with lots of cash and little desire for risk could lend their money to the banks at overnight rates, collect the interest, and then offer swaps against that steam, no? Of course, no one's going to get their 10th mansion off of this. A little riskier, someone holding variable payment debts could do the same, as long as the loans are diverse the risk could stay low. In this way, the risk at least shifts from "we're screwed if interest rates change" to "we're screwed if interest rates change and many diverse loans start to fail to make payments" in which case you're probably screwed regardless.
I don't see any evidence of any overall prudent investing on their part considering the entire bank had to be bailed out and FDIC limits relaxed.
Also, I think that as with FRC, their loans tended to have fairly low credit risk, so again not super sketchy, just poorly hedged.
> "SVB's focus on the innovation economy was a big winner in the past but may not remain so in the future, according to Dick Bove, the prominent banking analyst at Odeon Capital Group. The U.S. economy, in Bove's view, is shifting from a consumer-oriented economy driven by plenty of low-cost capital to a manufacturing economy marked by limited access to capital that's relatively costly."
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2023/01/11/svb...
> "And despite his downcast report, Bove maintained his hold rating on SVB's stock. Investors seem to be a bit more optimistic. After SVB's shares lost two-thirds of their value last year, they're up nearly 11% so far this year, closing Wednesday at $254.99 a piece."
Reading the tea leaves is an imprecise art, I guess.
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/12/silicon-valley-bank-signed-e...
If you took that sort of agreement and bet on being bailed out in the event of a failure, you won your bet.
Also, no one seems to have lost a dollars yet in this crisis (on the depositor side), so hard to say anyone ‘lost’ this time either.
Even though the FDIC chose to make depositors whole for SVB, Signature, and FRC, there's no written legal guarantee that they'll keep doing this, so in the face of that, I don't think people are forgetting the $250k FDIC limit.
Anyway, my point is no one's walking up and down Main St with their $10 million and opening 40 different bank accounts by hand because the finance industry invented a product (prior to SVB, even) so no one has to do that.
Also, I have 8 accounts at 6 different banks and I'm not even worth $1m so I can't imagine it's too hard for someone worth $10m to figure this out.
If you like seeing the inside of bank branches, and having unnecessary zoom meetings where the background is a picture of the inside of a bank branch, that's entirely up to you.
It is definitely an entirely different experience (either way), no doubt.
If you’re dealing with large sums regularly, that quickly balloons into an unmanageable mess.
The other question is if there's a recession, how much will used car prices, for cars that were new in 2021, drop.
Thus, buy bailing out depositors to an unlimited amount, bank managers are then incentivized to take more risks investing the depositor's money because the more risks they take, the more likely it is that one will pay out, raising the bank manager's bonus, and what their stocks are worth. Of course, by taking more risks, they also increase the chances that one will fail catastrophically, but since the depositors are all covered, up to an unlimited amount, eh.
Doesn't mean it's a good idea for the rest of us non-banks.
The list of large corporate banks that charge NSF fees and overdrafts is vanishingly small.
OTOH, I know of plenty of credit unions that still do both.
True for NSF fees, absolutely false for overdraft fees.
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_overdraft...
As compared to what we have now? With dubious financial instruments so opaque I'd have to spend 30 years lurking underneath desks on Wall Street eavesdropping on conversations just to have any clue at all how the fuck those work?
I'm almost comforted when there's a Bernie Madoff, because at least I can wrap my head around how a Ponzi scheme works (ignoring the ethics, obviously). I'm (irrationally?) worried that some of what's been going on the last few years actually makes plain Ponzi schemes look legitimate by comparison.
Not 25 years ago, we used to laugh about the stupid books with titles like "Dow Jones 100,000!" and whatnot, I think it was a Slashdot post way back when. And while we haven't quite reached that pinnacle of absurdity, it did hit 37,000 not so long ago.
None of us may be able to pick the queen of hearts, but some of us have caught on to the fact that it's three card monte. When it all falls down, should we console ourselves with "well at least the banks weren't small and local and vulnerable to economic shocks"?
In a Ponzi you lie about asset growth. In real investments you report real asset growth. If the system fails it won't be because people lied about what their assets were. It might be because they mis-estimated what those assets were worth. But that isn't a Ponzi.
Crucially though, it is actually possible for assets to grow. As long as there is new good business to finance, the whole thing doesn't need to be zero sum. And annoyingly, growing business is so much faster with a conplex financial system, that countries with such financial systems stand no chance. So even if you don't like the risk and excess in a complex financial system, it's really hard to go without.
Why do you think this is absurd? You know inflation means we’ll get there even without ridiculous multiples, right?
7.5%. Doesn't seem that unbelievable.
The trouble is that I've been told that it was far lower. By official government sources.
It would be interesting to include the DJIA into CPI though. I bet some people would lose their shit over that.
So a local bank will be great when a community transacts mostly with itself. SL happens right around when multinationals and corporate centralization started becoming more of a thing..
We live in the era of trillion dollar corporations, fintech, and the internet so a community bank ends up more like a small big bank. Its depositors are getting paid by corporations from way outside the community, and they’re spending money on the internet or at giant multinational retailers and thus shifting deposits outside the community. In this paradigm, it’s actually better to be huge and have a diversified customer base because the best way to keep your liabilities stable is to have the largest market share possible.
You’ll notice, banks usually have generous incentives for setting up direct deposit. Direct deposit is the best way for them to have a predictable measure of incoming deposits when there isn’t a high likelihood of one particular account transaction with another.
Economic shocks and rising interest rates aren't usually the reason that financial institutions engaging in risky or fraudulent behavior get caught, they usually just make it so the clock runs out on their scheme to roll over the losses or otherwise avoid getting caught.
The liquidity crisis of 2008 didn't cause Bernie Madoff's fund to collapse, the fact that it was a complete fraud from inception did. It just made it impossible to ignore.