People have been using DNS for all kinds of configuration for decades now, with great success. So what, other than a pedantic and grumpy programmer’s perspective, should keep us from using DNS for configuration records?
People have been using DNS for all kinds of configuration for decades now, with great success. So what, other than a pedantic and grumpy programmer’s perspective, should keep us from using DNS for configuration records?
2. Cache. People are caching DNS aggressively. Often more aggressive than what the TTL allows.
You don't want to save the fingerprint in a stale, insecure database like that.
I'm trying to figure out how having a stale fingerprint would be an automatic bad thing.
Let's assume you have a server with a fingerprint stored in DNS. Something happens and the server's certificate/key needs to change. So now you push out a new key fingerprint to DNS.
The failure mode for an out-of-date fingerprint would be to not trust the new server's key. In this case, the default failure mode is to fail safely. The client could then have a few new options, like querying the authoritative DNS server or prompt the user.
You can argue that you wouldn't want to have stale DNS caching in an automated system, but in a user-interactive mode, it's not the worst thing.
And for an automated system, the system should be robust enough to manage a bad fingerprint (fail safely again), or be in control of the entire infrastructure, including you DNS cache.
Or am I missing something?
But its kind of a strawman because nobody is suggesting putting unauthenticated keys in dns with no dnssec. The suggestion is either using dnssec, or have some sort of CA system.
I'd be interested to know where you get your data from. By my count, there are 142 ccTLDs that support it and 106 that don't, out of 248 ccTLDs.[0]
That's already more than half, but if you include the gTLDs then the number of TLDs signed in the DNS root goes up to 92% according to the best data I can find.[1]
If you start using other ways of using DNS, then you might as well not use DNS and instead develop something more suited to the purpose.
> I must say that I am not a fan of these floppy-based routers. Essentially, you are taking one of the most unreliable pieces of storage known to man, and trying to build security infrastructure on it. That's madness.
dns is not the foundation upon which you want to build your secure infrastructure.
Besides, we’re not talking about secure infrastructure per se, but distributing public metadata for IP addresses. That sounds like the prime thing DNS has been invented for to me.