The docker world is a neat example of this. The stories of ${absurdly high percent} of containers having vulnerabilities only gets to claim that because of "unpatched libraries." If you reduce it to the number of containers with exploitable vulnerabilities, it is still non-zero, but not nearly as high.
I can be confident I will be able to build >90% of go programs by cloning the repo and calling go build.
You are, of course, right that it has the possibility of happening. But by and large, it doesn't happen there any more often than it does in the dynamically linked cases. And, by and large, the dynamically linked cases are often a lot more complicated to deploy. (Granted, deployment for either should be doable nowadays.)
The dream, of course, is you just patch the library and call it a day. The reality seems to usually be a circus check on every application that you have deployed to see if they are impacted anyway.