You can make a very solid argument at the risk here is actually risk that was forced into these companies by the government.
You can make a very solid argument at the risk here is actually risk that was forced into these companies by the government.
Instead, I'd look at the concentration of depositors within narrow geographic and professional areas and their connections to one another, which allows panic to spread faster and enables a bank run; other banks have a much broader and diverse set of depositors. I'd also look at the foolishness of some of those depositors who deposited far too much in one bank instead of distributing funds across many banks. Both are errors of over-concentration. Retail banking only made up 7% of deposits at SVIB; the rest was VC/tech money. That's not by any stretch of the imagination like other banks, and that's what caused this unique failure, not the same interest rate hikes that all banks are exposed to (and which they all account for regularly in internal exercises and stress tests like responsible banks do).
I don't think so, this is a failure of proper risk management, specifically interest rate risk.
Banks, with a proper risk management system, routinely do stress tests to assess their exposure to different scenarios and hedge accordingly.
Even if they were going to go heavy with US debt, investment professionals normally use bond laddering for with fixed income funds to reduce that interest rate risk to the portfolio. They did not even do basic laddering!
The mitigation to interest rate risk is by buying them spaced out so principal returns are being re-invested at changing rates, and you are never tied to a specific rate. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bondladder.asp
Here you see https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/11/business/svb-bank-collapse-ex... their average yield at 1.79%
Recently we've been in an inverted yield curve where short term yield was superior to longterm yield.
The way I see it they did a few things wrong:
1 - bought too much of the same instrument (diversity)
2 - did not bond ladder (put themselves into a high risk situation)
3 - Moved unrealized risks into realized losses by fireselling bonds (bad timing which provoked liquidity crisis)
If you think about it, #1 & #2 were easily manageable. It is the colossal screwup of #3 on top of #1 & #2 that proved to be the coup de grace.
Whether the interest rates were going to increase or decrease was completely up in the air. No one knows after a few rate increases.
This is equivalent to selling at a loss a stock because it has a 3 - 6 month downtrend when the stock is still fundamentally sound, nothing has changed in the thesis instead of riding it out longer with the recognition you may not receive primo returns or even decent returns, but you won't be taking a big hit either.
Duration, duration, duration.
Their failure to recognize this as a risk even with “safe” assets is the problem. Hedging interest rate risk is not uncommon or difficult.
edit: HN is rate limiting me, but to see why the commenter below is wrong, just zoom out the chart he linked to 5 years view.
Fed was late, should have stomped on inflation early.