Also a standard failure mode of SSDs is refusing to accept writes, so you'll have to handle that case.
Even if there is a massive 10% block reserve, you looking at a random 10% of an entire encrypted drive.
Figuring out how to just decrypt those blocks is a very hard challenge, then figuring out the SSD block mapping is going to be very challenging, and then for a chance to maybe get something valuable from that 10%.
Multiple very difficult challenges for only a chance of maybe recovering something useful.
Related, I just had a hard drive head crash. I was able to use dd_rescue to read out 40% of the drive before it fully gave out. It's amazing, but at least NTFS stores data everywhere. I recovered a few small plain text file, but not a single image was recoverable. It was pretty shocking to me.
Not always. I suppose it depends on your information security case. If your goal is to secure your kids laptop from the average thief that is heading to the pawn shop, maybe "secure erase" of encrypted drives may be sufficient.
If on the other hand one is protecting intellectual property, customer data and so on, then perhaps that average thief was hired by someone with significant resources. I would wager that a percentage of the people reading this comment are using a work laptop and have some IP on their drive that in the wrong hands could cost billions. Even some of the emails I've seen could do significant damages.
/dev/zero would be sufficient.
Also easier to confirm things worked (if desired) since you know what to expect on read-back.
Write 5 gig of zeros? OK! You just got more drive reserve capacity!
But it depends on your risk profile, for most people a wipe-and-reuse is going to be fine, especially if the "reuser" is already a trusted entity.
https://www.harborfreight.com/spring-loaded-center-punch-621...