ChatGPT models are language models; they represent closeness between text utterances. It works by looking for the chains of words most similar or usually connected to those indicated in the prompt, with no understanding of what those words mean.
As a metaphor, think of an intern who every morning is asked to buy all the newspapers in paper form, cut out the news sentence by sentence, and put all the pieces of paper in piles grouped according to the words they contain.
Then, the director requests to write a news item on the increase in interest rates. The intern goes to the pile where all the snippets about interest rates are placed, will randomly get a bunch of them, and write a piece by linking the fragments together.
The intern has a PhD in English, so it is easy for them to adjust the wording to ensure consistency; and the topics more talked about will appear more often in the snippets, so the ones chosen are more likely to deal with popular issues. Yet the ideas expressed are a collection of concepts that might have made sense in their original context, but have been decontextualized and put together pell-mell, so there's no guarantee that they're saying anything useful.
No, it does not work that way. That’s how base GPT3 works. ChatGPT works via RLHF and so we don’t “know” how it decides to answer queries. That’s kind of the problem.
Take Stable Diffusion for instance: it can interpolate a painting from that huge dataset it has, and sometimes output a decent result that may look like what a good artist would do. But it doesn't have any kind of "creative process". If it tells you "I chose this theme because it reflects this deep societal problem", it will just be pretending.
It may not matter if all you want is a nice drawing, but when it's about, say, engineering, that's quite different.
Tuning the temperature and topP parameters you can also make the model avoid low probability completions (useful for less creative use cases where you need exact answers).
A proxy for confidence in what exactly?
Language models represent closeness of words, so a high probability would only express that those words are put together frequently in the corpus of text; not that their meanings are at all relevant to the problem at hand. Am I wrong?
This is because I'm operating under the assumption that sequences of words that appear often in the training set are more likely to represent something correct (otherwise you might as well train on random words). This only holds if the training set is big enough that you can estimate correctly (e.g. if the training set is small a very rare/wrong phrase may appear very often).
Maybe confidence was the wrong word, but for this kind of questions I would trust a high-probability answer way more than a low one. For questions belonging to very specific subjects, where training material is scarce, the model might have very skewed probabilities so they become less useful.
Maybe, as long as you're aware that this is the same kind of correctness that you get from looking at Google's first search results (the old kind of organic pages, not the "knowledge graph", which uses an different process - precisely to avoid being spammed by SEO) i.e. "correctness by popularity".
This means that the content that is more replicated will be considered more true by the system, regardless of its connection to reality or its coherence with the rest of the knowledge in the system. And you know what they say about big enough lies that you keep repeating millions of times.
This line of thought is a distraction, anyway. The likelehood that GPT-3 will do as well as a search engine on topics where there is an unambiguous and well-known answer does little to address the more general concern.
I understand the problem, but what better way do we currently have to measure its connection to reality? At least from a practical point of view it seems that LLMs have achieved way better performance than other methods in this regard, so repeatedness doesn't look like that bad a metric. Or rather, it's the best I think we currently have.
We can consider its responses to a broader range of questions than those having an unambiguous and well-known answer. Its propensity for making up 'facts', and for fabricating 'explanations' that are incoherent or even self-contradictory shows that any apparent understanding of the world being represented in the text is illusory.