If you hold a large amount of bitcoin your threat model should be way above the average person. It sounds like his infrastructure was specifically targeted. It can be very difficult to protect against targeted attacks from adversaries.
Not really. The device used to sign transactions should never be connected to the Internet.
Of course, it's also possible he just wanted something closer to the convenience of a bank account/credit card instead of a pile of cash and failed in the opsec.
Keep a small amount in a hot wallet for convenience and a larger amount (but not too large) in a cold wallet accessed via hardware. But the bulk shouldn’t be accessible without breaking into at least two lock vaults.
Then, when you're finally ready to access you funds, creating appointments at all those different banks, driving to them all, and then finding out enough of the keys are completely missing that you now cannot access any of your funds:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/business/safe-deposit-box...
Or... you know... you could just store your funds in one or more bank accounts.
Multisig is far superior for Bitcoin security. The keys can remain geographically separate at all times. Each signing operation requires only the partially signed transaction (PSBT) and the other public keys.
SSS is a good solution for other key material, and for storing a paper key to be used for recovery purposes, but it's completely inferior to multisig for normal management of a shared and/or large Bitcoin wallet.
I like to have one solution that can work for my entire cryptographic life.
At some point this level of care becomes more than absurd.
So, if the only way to secure BTC is to this cold wallet dance, then it's clear BTC is not a usable store of value compared to USD.
Most people do not store millions in cash or gold at home.
> attacks his own hypothetical situations
Of course, if someone did follow your example, and then the government compelled the banks to hand over access to the physical tokens, other people similar to you would come out and say "not your keys, not your bitcoin", or insist on even more byzantine forms of secret protection.
Not to mention, with your proposed scheme, actually using your BTC becomes significantly slower than any international bank transfer.
“Targeted attack” can mean many things. If you have control over wast sums of hard to trace treasure a determined attacker might just kidnap you and/or your loved ones, and win your cooperation using threats of violence.
Your suggested safety precaution is a sensible start, but far from enough if you have a lot of bitcoin.
https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1144996480/crypto-hacking-nor...