I note that this requires DNSSEC, which isn't very popular here on HN.
Before, an attacker only needed to 'global MITM' http requests. Your ISP could trivially do that. But your ISP couldn't just global MitM DNS queries for your domain unless you happen to use them as your registrar.
That is much harder than having an attacker use HTTP verification and global MITM the end user.
You are welcome to use CAA accounturi without DNSSEC and it will be effective.
Your zone may be vulnerable to an active man-in-the-middle DNS attack (which is hard to pull off), but it will still be protected against somebody figuring out how to upload an /.well-known/acme-challenge/ file on your domain and issue an unauthorized certificate from a foreign ACME account. This attack is much easier - I did it against a popular mail provider a few years ago.
I guess this is Fastmail :)
In 2014 Rob Mueller wrote: "Our future DNS plans include DNSSEC support (which then means we can also do DANE properly, which allows server-to-server email sending to be more secure), DMARC record support, and ideally one day Anycast support to make DNS lookups faster."
Lots of servers out there support DoH
Unfortunately, it offers no privacy. DNS is usually the precursor to a tls connection, and the domain name is sent in cleartext during the tls handshake. So the same people who would hijack your DNS queries are still privy to them if you use DoH (routers, ISPs, governments, etc).
There is encrypted TLS handshaking for hiding the TLS domain name indicator.
And DNSSEC doesn't provide any privacy to the end user. Both mechanisms provide something of value, and ideally they'd both be used together.
DNS seems eminently easy to secure against eavesdropping, given it is just distributed database, and a slowly consistent one at that. Someone just needs to step up to the plate and make a p2p resolver that communicates with a secure protocol, rather than the naive one spelled out in rfc1035. And with DNSSEC you wouldn't even have to worry about trusting/verifying other peers.
[0] The formal definition of someone who can break you, not the common usage that implies "trustworthy".
The purpose of a naming system is to give users a common way to consistently reference specific things. Anyone should be able to mention a name for a thing, and know that any other user will be able to look up that name and resolve it to the same thing.
GNS missed this lesson. Under GNS, every user has their own, slightly different view of naming; a name which one user is able to resolve may not be resolvable for another user, or (even worse) other users might see it resolve to something completely different.
There are many ways of defining how a "decentralized" naming system should work. This is one of them, and I'm sure it sounds cool, but it is not a good idea. Try again.
That's why I blackhole DoH on my network. Don't connect to my wireless if you want DoH privacy.
If you implement it correctly you are slightly more secure but there are better ways to spend your time.
If you are instead running your own DNS server, you're probably big enough that you can afford spending some time on configuring DNSSEC.
How is a registrar holding your keys in any aspect better than WebPKI right now?
> If you are instead running your own DNS server, you're probably big enough that you can afford spending some time on configuring DNSSEC.
And as the parent comment said, it's complicated and brittle, while offering little benefit. Plus you are still forced to trust your registrar, because it's doubtful you will go into the effort of interfacing with the TLD registry directly.
In this context, the question is more "how is a registrar holding your keys in any aspect worse?" There are a couple of mostly availability-related risk models where having DNSSEC at all is probably nets negative but your registrar generally has de facto control over your domain under the no-DNSSEC PKI anyway. There is a wide range of viable use-cases where telling your registrar that yeah turn on DNSSEC is nearly free and gets you ... well, the extremely minor benefit of being able to use DNS as a verifiable public kvmap.
I find it fairly obvious that such an extra operator in the middle of the trust chain between your webserver and your end-user is worse.
> but your registrar generally has de facto control over your domain under the no-DNSSEC PKI anyway.
Yes-ish. The issue is that DANE+DNSSEC would give the registrars control over the keys, which door they belong to and nobody could determine otherwise. A registrar trying to do the same right now with WebPKI would most likely be pathetically caught in the act, either by trying to redirect traffic without a valid certificate or trying to issue a certificate and it getting logged.
Back in the day, lots of things were complicated and brittle regarding having an internet presence.
If that were the standard for IT in general and networking in particular, we wouldn’t deploy a great many things.
That being said, it’s pretty easy these days to deploy DNSSEC; so is cryptographically verifying the chain of trust between your domain and the root.
Almost not a week goes by on HN where there's a headline about some well-known company or government organization that did something (or didn't do something) to either get themselves knocked off the internet or were compromised.
While companies screwing up DNSSEC has gotten some companies knocked of the net, it pales in comparison to other reasons for companies getting knocked off the net.
But whatever.
A more nuanced take on the ease of deploying DNSSEC: it's easy to do for the weekend hobbyist working on a side project or a homelab. Or a small organization whose registrar and internet host both support DNSSEC.
Deploying DNSSEC is definitely not easy if you're running at Facebook, Twitter, Apple, etc. scale. There are other reasons too, but there's no need to rehash once again.
You can use both DNSSEC and HTTPS. And actually, if your registrar and hosting provider are the same (e.g. Cloudflare, AWS), they might hold your keys anyway.
Sure, but you have the ability to choose if they're the same or not. Although an untrustworthy registrar right now would be quite bad, it wouldn't trivially compromise the security of your WebPKI TLS connections. One would not be able to say the same if we would have had deployed and built everything on top of DNSSEC+DANE.