Not really. Attacks against unintended emissions have been around for years, whats one more for the pile. The other thing I would question is wether or not this can actually capture and decode the signals at actual typing rates versus the hunt and peck speed demonstrated in the video...

Considering researchers have been able to read CRTs without looking at them by Van Eck phreaking, and more recently even get LCDs (http://www.omninerd.com/news/TEMPEST_Attack_on_LCD) it's not really even game changing for a realistically secured facility. http://www.tscm.com/TSCM101tempest.html is a primer, and http://cryptome.org/nsa-tempest.htm is an in-depth guide, if you think it's worth your time and money to mitigate this kind of vulnerability.

The article noted this: "They faulted cost pressures on keyboard manufacturers for not making keyboards more snoop proof."

So if this is true, at least it appears that new keyboards could be improved to block eavesdropping.