The biggest challenge in any dialogue about the F-35, like NASA's SLS, is that it's hard to separate how one feels about the acquisition itself vs. the end product. If you're a mission planner, you want the F-35's capabilities and you don't care about the ugly history of how the capability became available. If you're a taxpayer, you should be angry at how poorly managed the F-35 program was and the profligate sunk costs. Any attempt to collapse judgment about the F-35 onto a single axis will lead to low-quality discussions.
One can validly be wary that exalting the capabilities will lead to future acquisitions which learn no lessons from the F-35 because in the end, everyone will just praise the delivered capability after you weather the storm. From my vantage point in DoD aerospace, there is certainly a widespread recognition of the baggage associated with the F-35.
One thing is for certain - wishing they would just stop all production and start over is pure fantasy. There is too much commitment and reliance on these aircraft being in the force mix across many nations. It's not going to happen.