It is very easy for Turkish government to issue fake certificates via a Turkish company. They did it with Turktrust once (CA certificate issued to EGM and EGM issued a cert for *.google.com, EGM stands for Turkish Police), they can do it again.
The *google.com stuff is the more dangerous, but that can be detected pretty quickly if widely deployed - the intelligent way would be to only do so in very target situations and very, very rarely.
(Google added certificate pinning and other things to try to protect against this in the future)
The probabilities talk. 0.00001% this is happening in Europe (which would ended up with punishment for liable parties) vs. >50% this is happening in Turkey (punishment of journalists for exposing this etc).
So a rouge certificate for *.twitter.com can really ruin ordinary people life in Turkey. We are talking about a human life here.
But in the US the same thing can happen completely legally, via a National Security Letter, with no real oversight or appeal. And much of Europe is starting to follow the same path.