Such comment, even partly, does not exist.
>“What we’ve seen over the past 20 years is that they have delivered on every promise they’ve made earlier than they said they were going to deliver on it,” he said in a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council.
True, but actual deadline is like 2049, modernization/reform is only half done, and if anything PRC still needs to wait 5 years to finish building 1000+ nukes for deterrance and for USN ships to decommission during decade of concern. Like there's no factors that presses for TW invasion THIS YEAR OR NEXT unless there's TW/US independance drama during 2023-24 election cycles.
>“So when we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule it out.”
Note the 2027 "window" is purely a fabrication of US blob, conveniently timed for another election cycle. Just in terms of pure incentives, it seems like US is the one itching for an early war since current analysis suggest they might have chance in near short term but medium/long term regional force balance will favour PRC. Hence the eroding of strategic ambiguity etc. That said 2022/2023 window, AGAIN THAT'S RIGHT NOW, there's essentially nothing US can do to bolster posture in that timeframe. I surmise this is hyperbole testimony to fish for the emergency procurement powers Pentagon wants to support UKR war... but really for TW since MIC is not producing enough for both.