Some remotely exploitable Linux kernel WiFi vulnerabilities
lwn.net
lwn.net
I get that there are some use cases where performance really matters to the point where kernel network stack and drivers make a difference (high-throughput and/or low-latency services running on servers, high-performance routers...), but that should not be the default for everyone.
For over a decade our computers have gotten faster marginally, but our software has gotten slower at a greater rate.
You can barely navigate the web now with a new low end computer (that isn't a Chromebook). Most on this site won't care though because our machines cost $2,000+ and the web is Fine(tm); many folk aren't buying anything over $300 though.
2) These are memory bugs, so the introduction of Rust into the kernel could help us here potentially, no need for an architectural revolution.
We're talking about network stacks and network drivers, not web browsers. Migrating the network stack from the kernel to a user-land process is not going to measurably slow down web browsers, especially on modern systems with gigabytes of RAM, multiple cores, IOMMUs and whatnots.
> These are memory bugs, so the introduction of Rust into the kernel could help us here potentially, no need for an architectural revolution.
That would require rewriting the network stack and network drivers in Rust (driver code is much more likely to have bugs than the rest of the kernel) for this to be effective, otherwise you'll still have a lot of C code in the network path. I'd argue that this would be a bigger architectural revolution than porting the existing code and running it in user-land. MINIX3 went through such a change when drivers were removed from the kernel (can't find the publication about it right now) and they only required reasonably small changes when porting these to user-land, there were not rewritten from scratch.
But this is not just about memory safety, Rust code can still be vulnerable in many other ways (memory leaks, unsafe blocks, wrong assumptions, incorrect algorithm implementation, buggy/compromised toolchains...). Code running inside the trusted computing base of a system is a liability, enforcing privilege separation and principle of least authority reduces it.
Ah yes, the magic web-browser that doesn't do any kind of networking at all.
> Migrating the network stack from the kernel to a user-land process is not going to measurably slow down web browsers, especially on modern systems with IOMMUs and whatnots.
I don't know how you can possibly assert that, it's contradicting computer sciences' current understanding of operating system design as it relates to kernelmode/usermode switching, unless you're doing weird shared-memory things in userspace... which is terrifying.
> That would require rewriting the network stack and network drivers in Rust
Not really, C and Rust can interop just fine, you can have network drivers that are rust but the actual networking stack itself can remain C, if you want.
> but this is not just about memory safety, Rust code can still be vulnerable in many other ways
The post is literally memory safety bugs.
They clearly didn't claim that. Your webbrowser being slow nowadays is not because it needs to do some networking.
I am claiming that people keep making this claim and it no longer holds true because software is already losing too much performance for the value we get back.
That's my whole thesis.
Impacting networking affects the entire machine, especially in so far as a computer is increasingly just a dumb terminal to something else.
Look, If you make network requests potentially 20% slower then the browser performance will be impacted too, it's so obvious that I'm not sure how I can explain it simpler.
By how much? I am not sure, but you can't say it won't be slower at all unless we're talking about magic.
Pretending that it's trivial amounts of performance drop without evidence is the wrong approach. Show me how you can have similar performance with 20% increase in latency and I will change my stance here.
As it stands there are two things I know to be true:
Browsers rely on networking (as do many things, btw) and software is increasingly slow to provide similar value these days.
Grandma doesn't care if her tablet can't saturate a WiFi 6 link. Grandma doesn't care if her bank's web page takes an extra 75µs to traverse the user-land network stack. But she will care a whole lot if her savings are emptied while managing her bank account through her tablet. Even worse if her only fault was having her tablet powered on when the smart toaster of a neighbor compromised it because of a remotely exploitable vulnerability in her tablet's WiFi stack.
Or are you suggesting that grandma should've known better than to let her tablet outside of a Faraday cage?
> Pretending that it's trivial amounts of performance drop without evidence is the wrong approach.
Amdahl's law begs to differ. If it takes 5s for the web site to arrive from the bank's server, spending 5µs or 500µs in the network stack is completely irrelevant to grandma. Upgrading her cable internet to fiber to cut these 5s down to 500ms will have much more positive impact to her user experience than optimizing the crap out of her tablet's network stack from 5µs down to 1µs.
We're not talking microseconds, we're talking a fundamental problem in computer science for 30 years which is no closer to being solved.
We're talking about a classification of bugs which are solved by other means rather easily that do not take an unknown performance penalty on one of the slowest to improve component of modern computers.
Grandma isn't losing anything due to this, heartbleed: this ain't. Spectre: this aint. and crucially we have the tools to ensure this never happens again without throwing our hands up in the air and saying "WELL COMPUTER NO GO".
If you're actually scared, I invite you to run OpenBSD as I did. you will learn very quickly that performance is a virtue you can't live without, a few extra instructions here, a lack of cache on gettimeofday() and suddenly the real lag of using the machine is extremely frustrating.
And again, for the final time I will say this: we can fix this and make it never happen again without any loss in performance.
that you keep advocating a loss in performance tells me that you've spent a career making everyones life worse for your own experience, I am not a fan of that mentality.
or maybe I've worked in AAA Game Dev too long and we don't get the luxury of throwing away performance on a whim.
Maybe one day every phone, tablet and laptop will run such an operating system, but I doubt that we'll have this as a viable alternative anytime soon. In the meantime, I think there's a reason why Google with Fuchsia OS and other companies are hedging their bets mainly through micro-kernel-style approaches for their next-gen general-purpose operating systems.
It is an excellent way of getting me to dismiss you entirely.
My position is that: The best system is an improvement on the one we have, not some mythical potential solution that has unknown consequences.
Though I have a fondness for rump kernels.
This publication (http://www.minix3.org/docs/jorrit-herder/asci06.pdf) claims that MINIX3 could saturate a 1 Gb/s Ethernet link with an user-space network stack, with separate processes for the stack and the driver, on a rusty 32-bit micro-kernel that can't do SMP. In 2006.
The web browser isn't Netflix trying to serve hundreds of gigabits per second of encrypted video streams from a single server. Do you really need the ability to reliably saturate a 40 Gb/s Ethernet link to browse Hacker News comfortably? You'll hit various other bottlenecks long before performance for practical usages of web browsers will be significantly impacted by a user-land network stack.
As I've said, there are use-cases where extreme throughput and latency requirements warrant a design focusing on performance. Smartphones aren't one of them.
> I don't know how you can possibly assert that, it's contradicting computer sciences' current understanding of operating system design as it relates to kernelmode/usermode switching, unless you're doing weird shared-memory things in userspace... which is terrifying.
Again, not everyone is Netflix. I'd rather have a computer capped at 1 Gb/s speed with a user-land network stack than a computer capable of saturating a 40 Gb/s Ethernet link with a kernel network stack when I'm managing my bank accounts. Most end-users don't need ludicrously fast network speeds to browse funny cat GIFs on their web browsers.
Also, I've contributed code to multiple operating systems (MINIX3, SerenityOS). Running an user-land network stack isn't going to turn your 1 Gb/s Ethernet card into a 10 Mb/s Ethernet card.
> Not really, C and Rust can interop just fine, you can have network drivers that are rust but the actual networking stack itself can remain C, if you want.
As far as I can tell, the bug is in the network stack itself. A network driver written in Rust wouldn't immunize your Linux kernel here from this bug.
> The post is literally memory safety bugs.
The consequence is about computer security, of which memory safety bugs are but one cause among many.
Ironically, server workloads are the ones that are increasingly moving to networking stacks that run in user space, using frameworks like DPDK, with performance as a motivator: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Plane_Development_Kit
Of course, there are some caveats - from my understanding, typical DPDK use cases would turn over the entire NIC to a single application, meaning you aren't contending with sharing the network between multiple, potentially adversarial user mode processes. This is fine for a server, but not really appropriate for a PC or smartphone.
There's no general purpose IPC happening there.
Shared-memory things in userspace, i.e. buffers shared between 2 distinct user processes are no weirder than buffers that are shared between a user process and a kernel-mode driver. In both cases the buffers cannot be accessed by third parties.
Moreover, the transfer of data between 2 processes through a shared buffer can be done without any context switch (which could be slow), if the 2 processes are executed on distinct cores. Therefore having the network device driver as a distinct process does not have to cause any reduction in performance, if the means for inter-process communication are chosen wisely.
For any device driver that is implemented as a user process, the kernel can enable direct access to any I/O ports and memory-mapped I/O areas that are needed by the device, so the device driver can work in user mode without requiring any context switches.
Such direct I/O access cannot be enabled for ordinary processes, because those are not trusted enough and also because the direct I/O access could be enabled only for a single process at a time.
A dedicated device driver process solves both the trust problem and the multiple access problem equally well as a kernel-mode driver.
MINIX is a microkernel architecture - running drivers in userspace is one of its core features/selling points, and one that differentiates it from (modular) monolithic kernels such as Linux. So, this isn't a very solid line of reasoning.
It seems to me that the situation is the opposite - that moving drivers to userspace is an architectural change, which is more complex than porting an existing architecture to a new language.
> Rust code can still be vulnerable in many other ways
Sure, but not vulnerable in the way that the vulnerability under discussion is.
> memory leaks
Much harder in Rust than C, and also unlike in C, not going to result in security vulnerabilities.
> buggy/compromised toolchains
If you're going to assume that your toolchain is compromised, than anything is on the table, including the toolchain inserting a backdoor into the kernel and completely bypassing the proposed architectural change of moving drivers into user-space. And, needless to say, compiler bugs are rare in general, and compiler bugs that cause software vulnerabilities are nearly unheard of (and I've literally never seen one before).
Nobody thinking rationally is going to tell you that Rust is going to eliminate all your bugs or make your code secure. However, by far, the majority of security bugs in the Linux kernel are due to mistakes that the design of Rust either completely eliminates or massively reduces.
And security is intrinsically a tradeoff - the Linux kernel is not optimized for maximum security (which would be something formally-verified like seL4), but a compromise between security, performance, and development velocity. The claim is that Rust will provide significantly better security at basically the same performance and possibly modestly improved development velocity - the very least that one should do is rewrite the existing architecture in it (or, again, a language that meets or exceeds the specs of Rust) and then see what the bug rate is before deciding to take a guaranteed performance hit through an architectural change.
The first two versions of MINIX ran drivers inside the context of the kernel. The migration of drivers to user-space and overall emphasis on reliability didn't happen before MINIX3 in 2006.
Given that Linux nowadays has FUSE and UIO, still calling it a strictly monolithic kernel is probably a bit of a misnomer at this point. The same goes for Windows, NetBSD and others by the way.
> It seems to me that the situation is the opposite - that moving drivers to userspace is an architectural change, which is more complex than porting an existing architecture to a new language.
Trying to do a straightforward port of a C code base to Rust will quickly grind to a halt due to Rust's borrow checker. On a highly-optimized code base such as the Linux network stack, untangling every last optimization trick and shortcut to make the Rust compiler happy would require a large-scale refactoring that'll end up looking nothing like the original code base, at which point you might as well rewrite it from scratch.
In comparison, migrating that C code base to user-land would be less of a disruptive change to the code base (as was the case when MINIX3 did so with its drivers). It's still the same old network stack, adapted to run on a different environment.
> Sure, but not vulnerable in the way that the vulnerability under discussion is.
Rust isn't a silver bullet against every class of bug. Code that runs inside the trusted computing base means that it's one security bug away from system compromise. Writing that code in Rust doesn't change that.
You can barely navigate the web now with almost any computer. I have a high-end laptop and opening a few tabs from various sites on the Internet will cause the CPU usage and fan speed to spike. Just for a few tabs! Obviously not all sites do this, but the web has become a framework of advertising monstrosity and I can barely navigate and consume much of today's web content without enabling Reader Mode.
Redox-OS is based on this approach and is honestly extremely clean and easy to understand (when compared to MINIX which also adopts the same approach).
Wikipedia has a much better explanation than I can give right now: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microkernel#Performance
AIUI, in general, they don't. Avoiding the overhead of context switches is the research question in microkernels, and while there is progress being made, last I'd heard there wasn't a solution that didn't carry caveats. Now to be fair, sometimes those caveats are fine - ex. if you only write software in rust maybe you can get away with actually passing around memory without copies - but often they undermine the ability to run arbitrary software on general purpose hardware.
(If I'm behind and this has been solved in the general case, I'm happy to be corrected, but this was my undestanding of things as of a few years ago and I haven't heard about a breakthrough)
Yes, there is a performance hit but how large it is depends a lot on what you're doing.
"Switching" is one of the most costly operations and in Kernel mode you do not need to do it unless interacting with something in user space.. which you would only do because something in Userspace requested it somehow.
For other things, such as virtual memory, Microsoft found that the protections needed for virtual memory could be anywhere between 10 and 20%; but since there's no concept of virtual memory in kernel space: it's hard to say concretely that your program would be "20% faster". It would be too much of a different program.
If you run dpdk you get raw ethernet frames and run TCP yourself. This means that a program can receive any data sent to the machine. More sophisticate cards can do routing in hardware and present multiple "virtual" cards, but this is not yet commonly available in consumer hardware.
It's basically the kernel giving up on trying to do anything with the hardware, thus it's not available to any other process except the one that takes the hardware.
To have general purpose networking in user space you will end up with some other IPC which does not rely on sockets (because sockets are kernel) or shared memory which is dangerous as hell.
The operators of websites that derive most of their revenue from advertising are going to run their sites at whatever level users will tolerate. Where network drivers are faster they'll either cram in more ad tracking, or won't bother optimizing their existing trackers. If users stop accessing sites because they're too slow to load, operators will either cut down on ad tracking, or more likely, put some effort into optimizing the performance of their ad trackers.
Rust is itself something of an architectural revolution. I believe network drivers in userspace is already a thing, and eBPF may also have a role here. All of this is worth exploring. This is what progress in Linux looks like.
I don't mean to be glib but: citation needed?
One of the slowest moving hardware improvements (compared to CPU/Memory speeds) is networking.
It's going to take some serious convincing to tell me that we should just fork off performance; when software is already getting slower and slower.
It's not fair to blame advertisers exclusively, we also have electron and the hundreds of JS frameworks, that's before we get down to the low level abstractions that hook into basic programs.
The slowness of the web will not get any worse by moving the network stack to userspace. Guaranteed.
What has changed?
Microkernels aren't a dead idea and they are even making their way into consumer electronics. (see Zircon).
In fact, even newer oses are backing into microkernels. Windows adopted similar microkernel concepts in Vista with the HAL. Android adopted a HAL with project treble in android P.
The steady march of modern OSes has been moving driver logic out of kernel space and into user space.
The short-term effect may be a slight improvement, but it's a treadmill and the next wave of web crapware will more than nullify it.
If a microkernel architecture with worse performance got established on all mainstream devices, the experience would be worse in the short term but in the medium term, the crapware would have to adapt so that it again becomes just barely usable as it is today.
The problem is that the short-term gains create an incentive for users to buy/use the marginally faster hardware or kernel, which then forces everyone else to follow suit.
Ok, we could make it optional, i.e. additional security for those who wish it (on top of other things we could do, like the things you mentioned but which aren't a panacea too).
Do you have benchmarks that show the impact of switching to userspace on a typical, loaded desktop system with all kinds of workloads? Or are you just guessing?
This publication (http://www.minix3.org/docs/jorrit-herder/asci06.pdf) claims that MINIX3 could saturate a 1 Gb/s Ethernet link with an user-space network stack, with separate processes for the stack and the driver, on a rusty 32-bit micro-kernel that can't do SMP. In 2006.
[1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-to-achieve-low-latency/ - 30-45 microseconds on plain 10G ethernet - faster ethernet probably wouldn't improve much on this
[2] https://eli.thegreenplace.net/2018/measuring-context-switchi...
So someone else should have done it for you by now?
Be the change you want to see in the world.
I'm sure you have an excuse for not doing it personally. Just as I'm sure the person who you've mentally assigned responsibility has at least as good of an excuse too.
I have made dozens of commits to MINIX3, including a brand-new ISO 9660 file system implementation (https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix...).
I have made more than a hundred commits to SerenityOS (https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commits?author=boricj).
Just because I deplore the general state of security in mainstream operating systems doesn't mean that I demand that someone else does something about it for free.
I'm not paid to fix security bugs in the Linux kernel, do you expect me to fix these myself for free just because you want to? No one is entitled to my own free time spent hacking on random stuff.
See eg https://talawah.io/blog/linux-kernel-vs-dpdk-http-performanc...
I’m on board so long as there is a choice. Routers with crappy hardware need as much help as possible. Also tangentially this is why the current darling of VPN tech, WireGuard, is implemented in kernel not userspace.
Oh hell no! User-land driver can barely handle WiFi 4 speeds (72Mbps), with terrible CPU performance (1000's of context switches and interrupts per second).
For WiFi 5 (ac), WiFi 6 (ac), you need heavy WiFi firmware involvement, multiple DMA queues and kernel driver, and even with all that it requires special care to reach target performance. There is no chance in hell to reach that kind of performance in user-land.
"WEINBERG'S SECOND LAW: If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker that came along would destroy civilization."
And even worse, because kernel still have to distribute data to other userland program, you actually need another round trip so the impact need to multiply by two.
And also I don't think 10G routers/switchs ever use pure software based solution to handle the traffics. They are all hardware based or mixed solutions.
It's amazing that memory bandwidth / cpu speed / core counts grows so much that makes this even possible. But it still isn't a good idea.
The problem is that drivers are exploitable in the first place, so the solution is that we should make them not exploitable (using Rust, or a better language than Rust that fixes some of its problems) and try to preserve our performance that is rapidly being stolen away by bloated userspace software, rather than just shrug our shoulders and say "oh well, I guess that drivers are just intrinsically insecure".
1. Date of year has nothing to do with doing things correctly, ever.
2. Ironically, pulling it out of the kernel and running it in user-land will probably bring about more bugs and issues. I would much rather we just fix the problem where it is, and leave it at that, instead of potentially introducing new problems, like backdoors and exploits in the software provided. Not saying it WOULD happen, but the potential for it alone is just not worth the risk in my honest opinion. Let's just fix the right way, and be done with it.
No. I want the kernel to have as much functionality as possible. I have some zero dependency freestanding software that I boot Linux directly into. I really don't want to have to maintain additional user space in the form of C libraries. If I need to manage wifi connections, I should be able to make some system calls and be done with it without having to link to anything else.
Anything related to hardware belongs in the kernel so that all software can access it via Linux's amazing language agnostic system interface. If there are security problems, then that process should be improved without screwing up the interface by replacing it with user space C libraries. We have enough of that in the graphics stack.
As I understood the issues, this will probably lot's of "fun". You can broadcast the pcap files with any monitor mode capable wifi router. Luckily it's 5.1+ so most devices run very old vendor patched kernels and are probably not affected but at least for causing havoc this is really bad. As one issue is using beacon frames just a scan for networks should be enough for a crash. So you can at least crash and maybe exploit any device running recent Linux that scans for wifi networks.
I'm not sure how it's possible to do over the air remote code execution but I guess people are working on this.
DoSing is now "easy" as you say, just send those frames and a Linux computer that is currently listening to the network (e.g. scanning for networks) and thus processes the Beacon frames will at least crash. It might be the case that some wifi chips will filter those invalid frames or crash themselves, that depends on the actual hardware / firmware.
The victim must not be connected to a malicious AP or similar, so there is no requirement for tricking a user into something.
RCE is not trivial at all, but due to the nature of the different faults, might be possible. Therefore, see e.g. Mathy Vanhoef who discovered several impressive Wifi vulnerabilities in the past:
Beware that your WiFi password will be forgotten every VM reboot (but there is a workaround on the forums).
But it sure looks like it was a wise idea to spend the resources on isolating network hardware!
Seems like a pretty major vulnerability that affects tons of devices.
Edit: Looks like GCC removed the warning because it was unreliable. Clang and MSVC seem to be in better shape. https://gcc.gnu.org/legacy-ml/gcc-help/2011-05/msg00360.html
That is an odd position when -Wstringop-overflow also highly depends on the optimizer (and will frequently generate false positives!) but not only remains in GCC but is enabled by default (even without any -Wall/-Wextra).
Things like this are why its pays to compile your project with as many compilers as possible (as well as static analysis tools).
And some are obviously correct... But others would require a lot more understanding of the code to be sure they're correct.
Someone should go through this with a keen eye to check the fixes are actually correct, and aren't just making the fuzzer stop alerting while leaving a more subtle vulnerability open.
ArchLinux seems to also have it patched in 6.0.1-arch2-1 though[0].
Updating my own comment (too late to edit), that release is now out with the fixes. The full set of stable releases with these fixes is: 6.0.2, 5.19.16, 5.15.74, 5.10.148, and 5.4.218 (source: https://lwn.net/Articles/911272/).
So is this for public/open Wifi networks only? Or is it for any wireless network where you do not control the gateway?
https://lwn.net/Articles/911071/
>> anybody who uses WiFi on untrusted networks
> It's actually worse than that - you just have to be scanning (though one of the issues requires P2P functionality to be enabled).
> So basically it's just
>> anybody who uses WiFi
> unfortunately.
And:
> Sorry, it took me longer than expected but I just posted PoCs + logs here: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/13/5
> Most of the vulnerabilities were introduced in 5.1/5.2.
It's worse than that - android kernels process beacon frames even if wifi is disabled.
So you should be worried about this if you have an android 11/12 phone, even if you don't use wifi.
Linux desktop/laptop users should be worried if they have wifi enabled, even if not connected to a network.
>So you should be worried about this if you have an android 11/12 phone, even if you don't use wifi.
Is this issue (RCE even with wifi off across a huge swathe of devices ) common to many vulnerabilities, and we're just discussing this one because it hit the front page, or is this vulnerability especially... egregious?
This. The typical vulnerability requires an obscure hardware or software config, the user to do something unusual or foolish, or an attacker on the local network. This requires none of that.
Thanks for the explanation. I usually abhor how the word "wormable" is thrown around but it sounds like it might apply here, especially since many devices running this software may be difficult to patch? Yikes.
I actually just put in my two weeks notice to spend the rest of spooky season focused on my art rather than infosec, but I hope folks don't have this... abused.
Android 12 is 4.14
https://source.android.com/docs/core/architecture/kernel/and...
Mine is at 4.19.
/proc/version says 4.9.327.
Assuming not impacted, hopefully the November patch will address any remnants.
Guess I'm unlucky.
Though that may not be a generally used name as yet.
Keep using unsafe langs.
What will be there in next week? CVE in Chromium?
At this point betting sites should add category for that kind of games.
I do wonder what people of future will think about this:
"So they had research indicating that a lot of issues were related to memory, had technology which significantly reduces this issue, but they still kept doin mess for years?"
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/07/22/why-rust-for-safe...
https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Sec...
https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safet...
Memory issues and JIT (browsers) are two things that are responsible for disgusting amount of security issues
You cannot rewrite the entirety of the Linux kernel in another language overnight. You'd have years at least until it becomes production-ready. Not to mention the performance and memory use will be worse.
Certainly the situation can and should be better, but adopting this "it's so easy, how does nobody see it?" attitude helps no one.
People need to be aware how mem. safety affects security in critical software like Chromium or Microsoft's.
Rusts memory safety is not a 100% protection here.
Sometimes writing to a memory you own has huge side effects. And that part is not handled by rust.
How much?
The linux kernel in particular is perhaps the single most important piece of software on the planet. And we vulns like this all the time. Hundreds per year. And there's billions more lines of C and C++ out there handling all sorts of untrusted input.
The path off C and C++ is complicated as shit. Interop with Rust is messy and there aren't effective tools for automatic translation. Carbon is barely a language at this point (they don't even have a compiler) and doesn't yet provide safety. The story for the other alternative languages isn't any better. But I really wish the industry was throwing billions at this across dozens of major companies and open source organizations.
I'm not saying that using memory-safe languages (or a different kernel design that at least isolates bugs like this) fixes security forever. I'm saying that it would dramatically increase the cost of developing an exploit for the world's most important piece of software.
I'll even soften my request. Let's forget about memory safety. Let's just talk about regression tests. How the fuck is it possible for a vuln to regress in the kernel because nobody added a test when it was first fixed? This is a disaster. Everybody has just somehow decided that the current state of things is tolerable and I feel like I'm taking crazy pills.
The easiest path to sanity is probably rust, but we can't even get static analysis to be a norm...
I don't know. Somehow we need to shift industry culture. The good news is that this has been done. In the past, things we now take for granted like source control and unit tests weren't norms. Maybe someday tools like static analysis, fuzzing, and considerations for memory safety will be industry norms. I hope so.
But yes it should also be accompanied by better security architecture, i.e. not running network drivers in a monolithic kernel.
Raise awarness
(If you don't have a subscription, the article will become freely available to everyone on Oct 27th.)
tl;dr, it doesn't do anything interesting yet, but the infrastructure is getting there, and starting the process of evolving the kernel to using a safe language.