> The definition and purpose of a "common carrier" has no relation to monopoly status whatsoever, whether you're referring to English common law (the concept dates back to the 1600s), or in its modern US incarnations.
From https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl...:
"As part of its attempt to exempt new entrants from common carriage requirements, the FCC ruled that even providers who held themselves out as serving all comers were not common carriers unless they possessed market power, only to see this decision struck down on judicial review as exceeding the FCC’s statutory authority. Congress subsequently amended the statute to give the FCC the authority to exempt firms that lacked monopoly power from common carriage requirements. After experimenting with different approaches, the FCC now applies a traditional market-power framework to determine when it should exercise its so-called forbearance authority.
Even skeptical commentators recognize that it has become the dominant, if not the sole, criterion for determining the scope of common carriage."
> > Really, I'm curious if you think making websites liable for the content their users post will actually further the goals of free expression on the Internet.
> Yes, absolutely. If you do not want to operate as a common carrier — that is, on a non-discriminatory basis, neutral as to use and user — then you do not get the special privileges granted by the government to common carriers serving the public interest.
Is this dichotomy recognized as such in any consequential legal decisions? Where can it be shown that internet companies meet the standard criteria for being a common carrier? Since I cited a source, perhaps you might also.
> on a non-discriminatory basis
All references I can find to nondiscrimination in connection with common carriers are about price, e.g. charging different prices for the same service quality, or vice versa. How does this apply to social media companies who charge their users nothing, and whose service is not a commodity whose quality is measurable in absolute terms?
You clearly don't like section 230, but you're not really contending with the ramifications of your position.
Your analysis stops at the point of passage of some hypothetical legislation removing section 230 protections, which is not really the point of my question about free expression. What is the actual downstream systemic effect on what speech users are allowed to express, and that providers are discouraged from permitting?
I think it's safe to say that correctly identifying disinformation (not to mention libel) is flat-out impossible at a certain scale. Much disinformation is impossible to prove as such at any scale - would you require users to cite sources? Or just limit themselves to expressions of opinion?
Providers and users will thus have to satisfy themselves with imperfectly coarse filters and policies that inevitably chill more speech than intended. This probably goes double for video content, since analysis is that much more difficult.
Not an internet I would be interested in using.