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I am not a cypherpunk, but can/should we differentiate between 1. encouraging those running OpenSSL/TLS servers to use a. sane defaults that allow forward secrecy and b. ephemeral TLS session ticket keys, 2. using Google's in-house EC cipher implementations and 3. doing 1. and 2.?

We could do 1. only and still reap some benefit, correct?

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There are environments where ephemeral DH keys violate policy (those sessions can't be passively monitored; some sessions must be), which could militate against PFS suites becoming the default.

DHE is good, but I'm not sure forward secrecy is as pressing a security issue as simple adoption of TLS is. I admire Google's continued efforts to set the standard for its secure deployment, though.

Look at it from Google's point of view though:

Now they won't have "lawfully intercepted" packet captures showing up in their mailbox with demands that they decrypt them using their private key.

Correct!

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