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My reading wasn't that he thinks they built backdoors into them, but that the NSA might be aware of weaknesses in some of them, and be trying to promote the algorithms they know how to break.

"I think formal cryptographic standards are a force for evil."

May I ask what you view as the alternative? (No formal cryptographic standard, or something else?)

Peer review and "informal standards". Good examples of things that were, until long after their widespread adoption, informal standards include Curve25519, Salsa20 and ChaCha20, and Poly1305. A great example of an informal standard that remains an informal standard despite near-universal adoption is WireGuard. More things like WireGuard. Less things like X.509.

Both formal and informal peer review are why I like the FOIA, and standards / competition discussion to be open in general. I actually dislike closed peer review, or at least without some sort of time-gated release.

Likely scenarios, and that closed review hides:

- Peer review happened... But was lame. Surprisingly common, and often the typical case.

- If some discussion did come up on a likely attack... What? Was the rebuttal and final discussion satisfactory?

It's interesting if some gov team found additional things... But I'm less worried about that, they're effectively just an 'extra' review committee. Though as djb fears, a no-no if they ask to weaken something... And hence another reason it's good for the history of the alg to be public.

Edit: Now that storage and video are cheap, I can easily imagine a shift to requiring all emails + meetings to be fully published.

Edit: I can't reply some reason, but having been an academic reviewer, including for security, and won awards for best of year/decade academic papers, I can say academic peer review may not be doing what most people think, eg, it is often more about novelty and trends and increments from a 1 hour skim. Or catching only super obvious things outsiders and fresh researchers mess up on. Very diff from say a yearlong $1M dedicated pentest. Which I doubt happened. It's easy to tell which kind of review happened when reading a report... Hence me liking a call for openness here.

You get that the most important "peer review" in the PQC contest took the form of published academic research, right? NIST doesn't even have the technical capability to do the work we're talking about. My understanding is that they refereed; they weren't the peer reviewers.

Replying to your edit I've been an academic peer reviewer too. For all of its weaknesses, that kind of peer review is the premise of the PQC contest --- indeed, it's the premise of pretty much all of modern cryptography.

As much as I like the design of WireGuard, the original paper made stronger claims of security than were achieved with respect to key exchange models. Peer review and informal standards failed in catching this. From my perspective, the true benefit of a formal standardisation process such as this is that it dangles such a publishable target in front of researchers that we formally verify/disprove these claims out in the open.

WireGuard's design is superior to that of its competitors, and one of its distinctive features is that it lacks formal standardization. It's not as if we don't have decades of experiences with attempts to standardize our way into strong cryptography; see IPSEC for a particularly notorious example of how badly standards processes handle this stuff.

For sure, if a standardization process had been called to design a VPN protocol, I'd agree that the resulting design would almost certainly be less than WireGuard. I think that the competitive nature of the PQC process as well as soliciting completed submissions as opposed to a process to build from the ground-up helps in this regard. I don't think that engages with the point I was making, however: the original submission of WireGuard made claims that were incorrect, which would have arguably been caught sooner if it were a part of a formal standardization process, since researchers would have been incentivized to analyse it sooner.

Having come from a community that is often cleanup duty for unfounded claims (PL) and having to spend ~decade+ $100M+ efforts to do so... I didn't realize that about wireguard. That's pretty strange to read in 2022.

To be clear, WireGuard is a good VPN protocol, and definitely a secure design. I wouldn't recommend another over it. It's just the initial claims of security in the NDSS paper were incompatible with its design.

I'm sure it's a pretty good one, but it's quite hard to trust more than that both on the design + impl side if you ever have tried to verify (vs just test) such a system. Think the years of pain for something much more trivial like paxos + an impl of it.

In this case, looks like the community does value backing up its claims, and the protocol is verified: https://www.wireguard.com/formal-verification/ . Pretty awesome! The implementation itself seems to be written unsafely, so TBD there.

Thank you for actually explaining your POV. I don't understand how you expected me or the other commenters to gather this from your original comment.

If it's worth anything, you have changed my opinion on this. You raise very good points.

You're probably right about my original comment, and I apologize. These threads are full of very impassioned, very poorly-informed comments --- I'm not saying I'm well-informed about NIST PQC, because I'm not, but, I mean, just, wow --- and in circumstances like that I tend to play my cards very close to my chest; it's just a deeply ingrained message board habit of mine. I can see how it'd be annoying.

I spent almost 2 decades as a Daniel Bernstein ultra-fan --- he's a hometown hero, and also someone whose work was extremely important to me professionally in the 1990s, and, to me at least, he has always been kind and cheerful; he even tried to give us some ideas for ECC challenges for Cryptopals. I know what it's like to be in the situation of (a) deeply admiring Bernstein and (b) only really paying attention to one cryptographer in the world (Bernstein).

But talk to a bunch of other cryptographers --- and, also, learn about the work a lot of other cryptographers are doing --- and you're going to hear stories. I'm not going to say Bernstein has a bad reputation; for one thing, I'm not qualified to say that, and for another I don't think "bad" is the right word. So I'll put it this way: Bernstein has a fucked up reputation in his field. I am not at all happy to say that, but it's true.

Can you elaborate on his reputation?

Based only on random conversations and no serious interrogation of what happened, so take it for the very little this pure statement of opinion is worth, I'd say he has, chiefly, and in my own words, a reputation for being a prickly drama queen.

He has never been that to me; I've had just a few personal interactions with him, and they've been uniformly positive. My feeling is that he was generous with his time and expertise when I had questions, and pleasant and welcoming in person.

He has, in the intervening years, done several things that grossed me the fuck out, though. There are certainly people who revel in hating the guy. I'm not one of them.

Thanks for this reply. Can you point to a specific gross thing?

Sorry, I picked my words carefully in that last comment.

Is this related to his PhD advising of Appelbaum and his declaration in Todd v. Lovecruft?

Nope, but that was super gross too. See cryptography Twitter.

> If they knew anything about who the PQC team members were, they'd shoot milk out their nose at the suggestion that NSA had suborned backdoors from them.

Please point to this suggestion.

Reload the page, scroll to the top, and click the title, which will take you to the blog post we're commenting on, which makes the suggestion.