Quadratic voting can be bypassed if whales can make a large amount of identities. The lack of strong identity and Sybil attacks is the biggest unsolved problem in distributed systems of the free-to-join class.
Writing that out though, I realize that the root could be calculated by the client and simply verified on chain.
One token, one vote is an exponent of 1, it should be up to the voters to decide the exponent used based on the issue in order to choose the degree money influences decision making.
Equivalents of the doom trick using integer division and instead of >>1 (which is ÷2) of the exponents + a few newton iterations would also do the trick in floating point format
[1] https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/38468/calculate...
qv is robust under various non-ideal behavior (in large groups)
qv does not suffer from cyclic collective preferences (voting paradox)
qv does not suffer from discursive dilemma and doctrinal paradox.
qv counteracts majority rule problem. A small minority can get their voice heard if the intensity of their desire is strong.