A simple guide to quadratic voting
blog.tally.xyz
blog.tally.xyz
Also, shameless self plug for this toy I made that lets you compare first-past-the-post, quadratic, ranked choice, approval and about 2 dozen other voting systems:
Basically the voters and the candidates are colors. How much a voter prefers a candidate is a factor of their RGB distances (sorta)
https://dev--votevote.netlify.app/
I've been meaning to finish polishing it for a month now, but it's been hard to find the time. You know how it goes. Lots more voting systems and cool features are in the works though
Mine is currently lacking in Condorcet methods. The original prototype of it had a few more condorcet methods in it, but the core reason I wanted to rebuild it was to make heavy use of cacheing. E.g. no reason why both STAR and Borda should have to make the same calculation twice. Or why all these head to head methods need to produce the same exact matrix. So I have this "SuperElection" class that tries to break things down as much as possible
I think this did in fact help my performance but it's also made everything so... interconnected. Definitely been a good learning journey. But I might just re-implement kemeny-young and some others in a less efficient way and worry about optimizing them later
Quadratic voting can be bypassed if whales can make a large amount of identities. The lack of strong identity and Sybil attacks is the biggest unsolved problem in distributed systems of the free-to-join class.
Writing that out though, I realize that the root could be calculated by the client and simply verified on chain.
One token, one vote is an exponent of 1, it should be up to the voters to decide the exponent used based on the issue in order to choose the degree money influences decision making.
Equivalents of the doom trick using integer division and instead of >>1 (which is ÷2) of the exponents + a few newton iterations would also do the trick in floating point format
[1] https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/38468/calculate...
qv is robust under various non-ideal behavior (in large groups)
qv does not suffer from cyclic collective preferences (voting paradox)
qv does not suffer from discursive dilemma and doctrinal paradox.
qv counteracts majority rule problem. A small minority can get their voice heard if the intensity of their desire is strong.
I think this is the best use case for this voting structure: given a set of options to choose from at the same time, you're able to rank these democratically in a way that embodies all the benefits described in the article
Imagine getting involved in some shitcoin project where a guy with a hundredth of your investment has a tenth of your voting power
Edit: Rewording my comment for clarity and to remove passive aggressive phrasing.
While this setup is blatantly undemocratic, it could be hard to argue that their voting power should be reduced when they're contributing more to the pot than they're taking out. A bullshit justification to someone who actually values democracy, but this logic isn't entirely insane. Indeed, this scenario is reality in some places on earth.
America, as we all know, is nothing like this.
The smaller states take more than they give. There is no excuse to not make their votes count the same as everyone else's.
Votes in battleground states will always have more impact, but that has less to do with the electoral college makeup and more to do with the fact that we group the votes geographically and allocate them all to the same person. If/when Texas becomes purple, the impact of a vote there will be greater than one from a tiny deep red state, despite the fact that voters have less voting power.
In a Sibyl attack, an attacker can spend N resources to carry the weight of N people, gaining proportionate influence where proportionate influence is disallowed.
In this attack, the attacker can spend N resources to carry the weight of N^2 people.
That is, they can vote as the square root of the pool. If there's a million tokens in the pool, they only need a thousand to achieve dominance, unless someone else uses the same trick simultaneously.
This is the kind of thing that's so bad that it's hard to imagine someone didn't design this with the explicit purpose of exploiting it themselves down the line.
I'm not sure why you suggest quadric voting fixes this, as it actually makes this radically worse.
You seem to be reciting PR without understanding the underlying math.
I'm probably misunderstanding something, mind explaining like I'm five?
And indeed, if you split your tokens over even more accounts, each token gains even more voting power. If split over 10,000 accounts, you control 10,000 votes - instead of the 100 votes you had with 1 account.
Basically, with QV, those with tokens can do tricks to gain quadratically as much power as they are supposed to have.
I still can't see how the cheater with the 1000*1 votes has "achieved dominance"?
> If each of these accounts votes fully for the candidate
Quadratic voting kind of discourages that: the marginal vote has more utility given to another candidate. Non-cheaters will tend to spread around their votes.
I've always wondered how DAOs solved the Sybil problem, speculating that governance was no more meaningful or binding than a Twitter poll without a solution.
I see they just didn't.
The requirement for stuff to actually work most of the time seems to be somewhat imaginary.
Obviously sometimes it fails, and in some cases more spectacularly than others, such as with Theranos. But how many founders of companies with strategies that could kindly be called "Theranos adjacent" made of with lots of money? My guess is enough that knowing the real number would make all of us very sad and mad.
As far as a state level attack, it's possible. A complete solution to Sybil resistance is not simple.
The passport verification service is at https://coinpassport.net if you would like more information.
Stripe Identity seems to very explicitly not be intended to guarantee any form of uniqueness.
Anywhere you'd point me for passionate pro-PoH takes?
Proof of Humanity is definitely still an experiment, but has a much more open and less authoritarian design. Of all of the "proof of personhood" projects it has the most traction, especially within in the Ethereum community where its founder, Vitalik Buterin, has written a lot about it, including in his recent post on Soulbound:
Sybil resistance is not easy to solve absolutely, it's all about degrees.
However, as Jonah Goldberg is fond of saying, "Complexity is a subsidy."
When it comes to an official voting process, let simplicity drive us to hard-copy ballots filled out in person as much as possible.
"Something we learned in algebra class"? Seems like a weird thing to say, everyone who understands cryptocurrencies should find this trivial to understand, surely this isn't a real problem.
If you try to explain to my father what QV is by talking about cryptocurrency, you've lost before you even started. Same goes for much of algebra, in fact.
>The counted votes are the square root of the “credits” allocated to each choice.
Complex ... ok ...