In a Sibyl attack, an attacker can spend N resources to carry the weight of N people, gaining proportionate influence where proportionate influence is disallowed.
In this attack, the attacker can spend N resources to carry the weight of N^2 people.
That is, they can vote as the square root of the pool. If there's a million tokens in the pool, they only need a thousand to achieve dominance, unless someone else uses the same trick simultaneously.
This is the kind of thing that's so bad that it's hard to imagine someone didn't design this with the explicit purpose of exploiting it themselves down the line.
I'm not sure why you suggest quadric voting fixes this, as it actually makes this radically worse.
You seem to be reciting PR without understanding the underlying math.
I'm probably misunderstanding something, mind explaining like I'm five?
And indeed, if you split your tokens over even more accounts, each token gains even more voting power. If split over 10,000 accounts, you control 10,000 votes - instead of the 100 votes you had with 1 account.
Basically, with QV, those with tokens can do tricks to gain quadratically as much power as they are supposed to have.
I still can't see how the cheater with the 1000*1 votes has "achieved dominance"?
> If each of these accounts votes fully for the candidate
Quadratic voting kind of discourages that: the marginal vote has more utility given to another candidate. Non-cheaters will tend to spread around their votes.