Sometimes it's just nice to have something to compare your simulation results to.
It really matters that nuclear weapons go bang when you want, but not when you don't.
An example of why one needs to care about such things in stockpile stewardship -- plutonium's own radioactivity means that helium is effectively being born within the crystal lattice, causing damage, distortion, and swelling. It isn't a guarantee that a bomb that worked 50 years ago will work today.
Of course this "safety" has absolutely nothing to do with what the public naturally assumes is meant, which is typically that it won't go bang when you don't push the button, or leak, or be hijacked, or fall out of a plane carrying it. The DoE considers none of those its responsibility under the law.
One might guess that going bang when the button is not pressed would be extremely unlikely. But when a B-52 crew made a booboo and dropped a pair of hydrogen bombs in a farmer's field, investigation showed that all of the processes that would have set them off completed; just not all on the same bomb.
Would you prefer to know? Or go off a hunch?
Intuitively, simply not building a bomb seems sufficient to prevent any accidental detonations.
But I'm of course no expert.
The cores of these weapons are unlike any environment on Earth. Maintaining the stockpile without running simulations is negligent.
US ICBM silo map https://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-45b10c7543ed5219a77858...
> okay with nuclear weapons not working when someone wants them to
Obviously s/he hoped the weapons not to explode when fired.
GP wished for a (moderately) likely failure: failure to detonate. GP obviously didn't wish for unlikely failures, like spontaneous detonation, ICBMs all flying to Washington DC, etc.
There is the case of the Goldsboro B52 in 1961 crash in which three bombs could fell out of a plane and could have gone off but didn’t :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash
Edit: of the four bombs one was only very close to going off, and a lot of lessons were learnt from this event 60 years ago.
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-2.html
In principle there isn't really a limit to how small you can make it, just with decreasing efficiency and (with traditional implosive designs) a higher detinator-to-fissile material ratio. Things like laser implosion remove this design constraint, however, and would let you consider things like millimeter-sized pellets.
I suspect the soda-can sized charges you recall were conventional explosives for the small, non-nuke prototype they tried out.
No, we got ones designed to work in nuclear submarines [1]. Civil reactors don’t make weapons-grade anything.
[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0301421584...
Thanks.
In the longer term, who could have known then or even cared how to maintain the transition to a no-test regime? What the treaties' drafters might have been thinking is now moot. Those people are long gone, it's your problem now.