>All you're doing is constructing straw men to be smarter than.
No - for example, the barber paradox (in the form of Russell's paradox) is what led to a revolution in set theory around 1910 and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. It is a real problem, and led to the notions of classes and sets being distinct (and universes? I forget..)
The sloppy "definable number" game runs afoul of exactly these issues. If you look on google scholar for "definable reals" or "non-constructive reals" you can get a taste of the research still being done in this area. It's not as simple as I think you think it is.
The short of it is that there are many, many notions of definable, and they are not equivalent. Thus I asked you to provide one you think is suitable for your claims.
> the only thing those numbers provide is making the limits Cauchy sequences exist.
This is far from true - depending on the (set-theoretic) model of the reals, you end up with all sorts of interesting pure math questions. If I recall, certain sequences of modules over the reals end up with different homology depending on crazy subtle questions of the model of reals.
There's also a lot of equivalent methods for defining reals, most require proof to show they are equivalent.
There are lot of interesting questions on the constructions of the reals (Conway called his surreal numbers his best discovery, and they are spectacular - they spit out the reals in a really interesting way from only two rules - no Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts or common constructions in sight. They were discovered analyzing perfect information two player games....). Here's a paper with many cool constructions of the reals [1]. Claiming the only thing they provide is Cauchy sequence limits is missing a lot of other useful properties.
So you may not find the reals useful, but they certainly are incredibly deep and fascinating. But they are useful far beyond the concept of Cauchy sequences.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1506.03467v1.pdf