"Clear delegation" is the key phrase, there. The Court rejects the idea that Congress can create broad grants of authority and instead propounds the idea that it has to explicitly authorize every potential scenario.
> Thus, in certain extraordinary cases, both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent make us “reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory text” the delegation claimed to be lurking there. To convince us otherwise, something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary. The agency instead must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the power it claims.
I can find nowhere where they say that Congress cannot delegate broad powers, only that it's not obvious that Congress did or that they intended to. Do you have a citation to the contrary, or are you making assumptions based on the news coverage?
Imagine Congress passes an act next year banning abortion, and creates a new agency to enforce that act. The next year, a new method is invented that can induce abortions. Can that agency regulate it? By the logic of the Court, it can't, because Congress never explicitly authorized regulation of that particular form of abortion (because it didn't exist yet).
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2013-title42/html...
If you think that isn't a broad, explicit grant of authority to regulate air pollution from stationary sources, I don't know what to tell you.
The majority on the decision are basically saying, "well, my gut says they didn't mean that much authority, so we're going to shut down this program."
The term "system of emissions reduction" means control technology like scrubbers. What the law says is that the EPA can do is look at the state of the art for things like particulate matter scrubbers, and set an emissions standard based on the reduction that can be achieved using those technologies.
But it's infeasible using current technology to scrub out CO2 from power plant emissions.
So the Majority asserts. The law, however, specifies nothing of the sort and intentionally uses broad phrasing.
The plain meaning of "system of emissions reduction" is "a set of measures that work together to reduce emissions" (as the EPA itself points out). And this is consistent with usage elsewhere in the Clean Air Act: in it, Congress refers to a cap-and-trade setup as an "emission allocation and transfer system." Systems clearly can be things that aren't just control technology.
The Majority is inventing an arbitrary and unsupported narrow definition of system for ideological reasons.
Apart from being clear from the individual statutory provisions, that’s the premise of the statute as a whole. The whole idea was that the EPA could limit emissions to the point that existing point sources could go out and buy equipment to meet the emissions criteria. The statute thus talks about BACT versus RACT and LEAR and whatnot. (I took a bunch of classes in environmental law in law school.)
If you read “system” to be a nonce word that can refer to any possible measure, then the statute makes no sense. The EPA could just pick an arbitrary emissions limit, and demand industry-level restructuring to hit that limit. That’s exactly what Congress was trying to avoid by imposing that requirement.
The statute as a whole clearly delineates between when it means to limit authority to technological systems of control. Elsewhere in different provisions, Congress declined to give the EPA broad authority as it does in 111, using phrasing like
"reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology."
"best available retrofit technology"
"best available control technology"
"maximum achievable control technology"
Congress clearly was conscious of the difference between technological systems and more general ones, and it declined to limit the EPA's authority here to technological systems.
But the fact that those other things are all emissions control technologies strongly suggests that “system of emissions reduction” is referring to a some kind of emissions control technology, not a wholesale change in the operation of the industry.
If a statute addressed SVN, git, Mercurial, and CVS, and then had a catch all referring to “system for version control,” how would you read the meaning of the latter term?
Look at it this way. Wouldn’t it be odd for Congress to go to all the trouble of enumerating all these levels of emissions control technologies that apply in different situations (new sources versus old sources) and then have this catch-all provision that gives the EPA sweeping powers far beyond unrelated to emissions control technologies?
The court has stated if they want to extend their authority to the level they are enacting then congress must pass laws to expressly denote that intention.
States have rights in the original law. They are exercising this right and the court has agreed with them.
I think the last sentence in the original article sum's up why people are truly upset. Remember the court didn't say the EPA can't do these things in the future just that Congress would have to give it the authority.
From the original article:
"It's now clear this court will turn a sceptical eye to agency attempts to cite vague or broad laws to enact any sort of major regulatory changes. That's a significant development, given how difficult it has been for Congress to pass substantive new legislation in recent years. The time when presidents could find unilateral "work-arounds" in existing law may be coming to an end."
[0] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2013-title42/html...
Where, exactly, are you claiming that the EPA ran afoul of the law?
Note the portion that states "taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction". This is in the very first paragraph. The argument is that they have not adequately done this.
It's about damn time if you ask me. As a country we need to hold our elected representatives accountable. We send legislators to congress to legislate not to simply be talking heads who pass the buck.
Also, consistently and repeatedly asking others to research for you is an easy debating tactic used frequently to bury inconvenient facts behind a barrage of requests.
I love it when textualists go anti-textualist.
If people are going to espouse an absolutist ideology, they should at least be consistent.
To use an analogy, nobody is saying that the DOJ needs authority to create drug diversion programs. But this is like the DOJ pointing to the drug laws to justify a sweeping effort to combat the obesity epidemic.
Restructuring the energy industry to address climate is a different solution to a different problem, related only by the commonality of emissions into air. It’s like using drug laws to regulate processed foods because both involve harm caused by ingesting things.
> Section 111(d) thus ensures that EPA regulates existing power plants’ emissions of all pollutants. When the pollutant at issue falls within the NAAQS or HAP programs, EPA need do no more. But when the pollutant falls outside those programs, Section 111(d) requires EPA to set an emissions level for currently operating power plants (and other stationary sources). That means no pollutant from such a source can go unregulated: As the Senate Report explained, Section 111(d) guarantees that “there should be no gaps in control activities pertaining to stationary source emissions that pose any significant danger to public health or welfare.” S. Rep. No. 91–1196, p. 20 (1970). Reflecting that language, the majority calls Section 111(d) a “gap-filler.” Ante, at 5. It might also be thought of as a backstop or catch-all provision, protecting against pollutants that the NAAQS and HAP programs let go by. But the section is not, as the majority further claims, an “ancillary provision” or a statutory “backwater.” Ante, at 20, 26. That characterization is a non-sequitur. That something is a backstop does not make it a backwater. Even if they are needed only infrequently, see ante, at 6, 20, backstops can perform a critical function—and this one surely does. Again, Section 111(d) tells EPA that when a pollutant—like carbon dioxide—is not regulated through other programs, EPA must undertake a further regulatory effort to control that substance’s emission from existing stationary sources. In that way, Section 111(d) operates to ensure that the Act achieves comprehensive pollution control.
That's pretty damn explicit.
That's pretty clearly a broad delegation of regulatory authority.